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ABSTRACT 
Business risk management (BRM) programs can help reduce the risk inherent in the agricultural 
industry that is associated with income variability. These programs are commonly in the form of 
insurance (production insurance, net margin insurance, etc.). There is a vast literature on 
investment decision under risk and uncertainty, but there exists a gap in the empirical analysis of 
the effects risk-reducing Canadian BRM programs have on investment. This paper examines the 
relationship between Canadian BRM programs and on-farm capital investment. This is done using 
theory and empirical analysis motivated by the risk-balancing framework put forward by Gabriel 
and Baker (1980). Previous papers have researched BRM programs using the risk-balancing 
approach, but do not look at investment separately from other factors that influence the level of 
financial risk (Uzea et al. 2014; de Mey et al. 2014). Analysis of repeated cross-sectional data from 
the Farm Financial Survey is conducted. Results show that there exists a significant and positive 
correlation between Canadian BRM programs and the decision to invest. Results also show that 
BRM program participation is positively correlated with higher levels of financial risk. 
Understanding the effects of BRM programs on investment is essential for designing and directing 
Canadian agricultural policy with implications for long-term farm productivity. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Business risk management (BRM) programs are important policy tools used to support the 
Canadian agricultural industry. These programs are designed to mitigate the risk that is inherent in 
agriculture through forms of yield insurance, margin insurance, and direct payments. While these 
programs target risk associated with income variability, there have been many studies indicating 
that there can be indirect effects of adjusting the risk faced by a farm business (e.g., Hennessey, 
1998; O'Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Turvey, 2012). Altering the risk 
profile of a business can affect operational behaviour and farm-level decisions. 
A typical example of this is the moral hazard issue with insurance. Moral hazard occurs 
when risk is reduced under insurance, and a firm alters their behavior as a result of the reduced 
risk. In the context of agricultural BRM programs and farm operators, a particular risk is covered 
under insurance which may incentivize the insured to increase or induce risk in another aspect of 
their operation. If the adjustment of a risk-related behaviour is made given that it will raise their 
expected well-being, profit, or another objective, then the adjustment in behaviour can be viewed 
as optimizing with respect to the operations objective function. This concept has been generalized 
into a framework called risk balancing (Gabriel and Baker, 1980; Collins, 1985). The general 
theory states that the optimal level of different sources of risk faced by a firm will adjust with 
respect to each other. In the context of BRM programs, it is important to consider the distinction 
between moral hazard and optimization when discussing the context of farm-level behavioural 
adjustments (Turvey, 2012). 
Risk balancing can complicate the primary purpose of BRM programs: risk reduction. The 
overall risk may not decrease if other risk components are adjusting in a manner that counters the 
effects of the BRM program. That said, there may be positive adjustments that occur because of 
or related to BRM program participation. The success or failure of BRM programs can be analyzed 
by looking further into the factors that influence different types of risk, how the factors and risk 
levels adjust, and if these outcomes are aligned with the stated policy goals.   
This paper explores the relationship between BRM program enrollment and on-farm capital 
investment behaviour of Canadian farms by examining the role of altering a farm operation’s risk 
on their investment decision. The relationship between BRM programs and financial risk is also 
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examined. The risk balancing framework motivates analysis of these relationships. Previous 
studies have examined risk balancing behaviour of farms but generally frame this behaviour in 
negative contexts by commenting on changes in the overall likelihood of default (e.g., Featherstone 
et al., 1988; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011; Uzea et al., 2014; Vercammen, 2007). The literature 
on agricultural insurance programs and farm-level decisions is also commonly framed in a negative 
context such as examining the presence of moral hazard by looking at changes in input and output 
decisions under insurance (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Ramaswami, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 
1996). Viewing investment as a risk-altering component shifts the focus of farm insurance and risk 
balancing discussions away from negative behavioural adjustments towards potential productivity 
gains through capital investment.  
Evidence of a positive relationship between BRM program participation and investment is 
found using a representative sample of Canadian farms obtained from the Farm Financial Survey 
(FFS). A statistically significant positive correlation between the likelihood of investment and 
BRM program enrolment is found across various policy periods and farm types. A statistically 
significant positive correlation is found between BRM program enrolment and financial risk across 
two measures of financial risk as well. The positive correlation between BRM program enrolment 
and the likelihood of investment indicates that BRM programs may have indirect effects on risk-
related farm-level decisions such as investment. A possible interpretation of the results is that BRM 
programs help operations that choose to invest; or more generally, farms that decide to invest may 
also decide to enrol in BRM programs. Investment behaviour is an important factor in the growth 
and productivity of agricultural operations. Evidence of the correlation between investment and 
BRM programs highlights the importance for policymakers to take into consideration investment 
behaviour when designing and evaluating agricultural programs. 
The remainder of the paper begins with background on Canadian BRM programs and a 
literature review of risk balancing theory, empirical applications of risk balancing, and investment 
behaviour in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of risk balancing theory using models 
developed by Gabriel and Baker (1980) and Collins (1985) and the theory in the context of BRM 
programs and investment. The empirical methodology is conducted in Chapter 4, followed by 
results and discussion in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the paper with a summary and further 
research suggestions. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
This chapter is separated into three sections. The first section lays out the policy objectives 
and technical design of the Canadian BRM programs examined in the analysis for this paper. The 
second section reviews the theoretical interpretations and empirical application of risk balancing 
theory in the literature. As the literature on risk and financial structure is extensive, papers and 
empirical studies most relevant to the application in this paper are the focus of this section. The 
final section summarizes the relevant literature on the effect of risk and risk-related factors on 
investment behaviour and capital structure. This includes previous empirical literature examining 
the relationship between investment and BRM programs.   
2.1 BRM Programs in Canada 
In recent decades, Canada's suite of BRM programs has been relatively stable. Under the 
Canadian Agricultural Policy Framework (APF) spanning from 2003 to 2007, subsidized 
production insurance and a form of margin insurance called the Canadian Agriculture Income 
Stabilization (CAIS) program were a part of Canada's suite of BRM programs. Following APF, 
the Growing Forward farm bill maintained the subsidized yield and margin insurance under the 
titles AgriInsurance and AgriStability, respectively. The first Growing Forward spanned from 
2008 to 2012. Growing Forward 2 maintained the suite of BRM programs under the same names 
between 2013 and 2018. The level of coverage and margin reduction required to trigger a payment 
has varied slightly, but the programs’ general designs have remained similar across the different 
agricultural policy periods. Funding for the BRM programs across the APF and Growing Forward 
policy periods are split 60:40 between the federal government and the provinces and territories 
respectively.  
2.1.1 Technical Details 
The CAIS was a margin-based insurance. A payout occurred when the current year’s 
allowable revenue less expenses was below the operation’s five-year Olympic average of that 
measurement. This historical average is known as the reference margin. While 100% of an 
operation’s reference margin is covered, the level of payout depends on the margin of loss. A loss 
of 0% to 15% triggered a 50% payout of that marginal loss. A loss of 15% to 30% triggered a 70% 
payout of that marginal loss. A loss of 30% to 100% triggered an 80% payout of that marginal loss. 
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A negative margin, or loss greater than 100% of an operation’s reference margin, resulted in a 60% 
payout on the negative margin.  
BRM programs for Growing Forward 1 were launched in 2008. The new federal margin 
insurance, AgriStability, applied the same use of a reference margin as in CAIS. AgriStability 
provided coverage for 85% of an operation’s reference margin, unlike CAIS which covered 100%. 
In Growing Forward, the upper portion of coverage was replaced by AgriInvest which allowed 
farmers to place up to 100% of their net allowable sale in an account wherein the government 
matched 1% of the farmer’s contributions, up to $15,000. Under AgriStability, a loss between 15% 
and 30% triggered a 70% payout of that marginal loss. A loss of 30% to 100% triggered an 80% 
payout of that marginal loss. A loss of greater than 100% of the reference margin triggered a 60% 
payout of the negative margin.  
Growing Forward 2 was implemented in 2013 and made only minor changes to the 
previous suite of BRM programs. This iteration of AgriStability covered 70% of an operation's 
reference margin. AgriInvest remained intact with its intended purpose of covering small marginal 
declines. Changes were made to how the reference margin was calculated, such as widening the 
scope of allowable revenue and expenses. A significant change to the program was the use of an 
operation’s allowable expenses as their program reference margin if this value was lower than the 
traditional reference margin calculation. This decreased coverage for operations with low input 
costs relative to their reference margin. A loss of 30% to 100% triggered a 70% payout of that 
marginal loss. A negative margin results in a 60% payout of that marginal loss. Figure (1) gives a 
visual depiction of the coverage provided by CAIS and AgriStability from Growing Forward 1 
and 2. 
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Figure 2.1 Coverage and Payout Scheme for Margin Insurance Programs1 
 
Production insurance has remained relatively unchanged through the policy periods. 
Production insurance insures a specified level of yield, and quality in some cases, for a given 
season and crop. The level of coverage is a percentage of a producer’s average yields determined 
by their historical yields. The producer is in a position to claim if their actual yield is below the 
insured yield amount due to an insured peril such as drought, excessive moisture or rainfall, flood, 
or frost. The payout is calculated by multiplying the difference between actual and insured yield 
with a price determined in the contract. The base price for crop insurance in Saskatchewan is the 
forecasted farm gate market price determined in January by the Market Analysis Group at 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation, 2018).  
                                                          
1 Percentages inside bars represent the proportion of the margin that is paid out under the 
program. 
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The primary objective of covering a specified level of quantity or quality of production is 
carried throughout APF and Growing Forward 1 and 2. The level of coverage, price options, and 
other program parameters can vary across provinces and individuals within provinces, even within 
policy periods. Although the cost of government production insurance is jointly shared between 
the federal and the provincial and territorial levels of government, the provinces are responsible 
for administering production insurance. 
2.1.2 Policy Goals 
There are two types of policy goals to look at when evaluating BRM programs. The first is 
the policy directives for the overarching agricultural policy framework (i.e., APF and Growing 
Forward). The second is the policy goals for the individual BRM programs. While each program 
has a primary purpose, some are suffixed by supplementary goals and general principles that 
dictate the function and application of the program (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2005; 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008). 
A 2005 APF federal-provincial-territorial agreement states the objectives of the policy 
framework as positioning Canada to be a global leader in food safety, innovation, and 
environmentally-responsible production. Farm-level investment can play an important role in each 
of these objectives.  
The desired strategic outcomes for Growing Forward are laid out in a federal-provincial-
territorial agreement as the following: “a sector that is proactive in managing risk, a sector that 
contributes to society’s priorities, and a competitive and innovative sector” (Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada, 2008). The first point refers directly to BRM programs and their primary goal of 
managing risk. The third point can be interpreted as promoting investment by farms which 
facilitate the adoption of innovative technologies and practices. The third point is reiterated in the 
agreement in a section stating the general principles of risk management programming. It states 
that BRM programs “should contribute to market-oriented adjustments and adoption of 
technological innovations” (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008). 
The general principles of risk management programming also state that “programs should 
minimize moral hazard and not influence farmers’ production and marketing decisions” 
(Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008). The interpretation of moral hazard likely refers to 
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decisions related to the risk that is covered under the program. For example, if a farmer has yield 
insurance for canola, but not other crops, he may decide to plant a higher proportion of canola, 
reducing the diversity of his operation and increasing the risk and probability of payout. 
Alternatively, if the moral hazard problem is viewed in a whole farm perspective, the adjustment 
of risky behaviour could occur in another aspect of the farm business not directly related to current 
canola yields such as investment or financing decisions. 
The same document states that “payments for the purpose of stabilization, disaster 
mitigation or production loss should not be capitalized into assets” (Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada, 2008).  Capitalization of assets is seen with Common Agricultural Policy payments and 
land prices in Europe, where direct farm payments caused farmland prices to inflate (Guastella et 
al., 2018; Kirwan and Roberts, 2016; O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2016). A less direct form of 
capitalization of program payments may occur through increased productivity. Program payments 
may influence farmers’ behaviour in a way that results in increased productivity. The increased 
productivity may then be capitalized into farm assets. 
Across both APF and Growing Forward policy periods, the primary policy goal for BRM 
programs was to provide agricultural producers with tools to manage risk and stabilize farm 
incomes. Income stabilization programs like CAIS and AgriStability targeted whole farm incomes 
and aimed to provide support for large margin losses. Production insurance under APF and 
AgriInsurance were designed to stabilize farmers' incomes by minimizing the financial impact of 
production losses due to natural causes.   
2.2 Risk Balancing 
The theory of risk balancing was formalized in a paper by Gabriel and Baker (1980). The 
risk balancing framework is presented as an equation representing the total risk faced by a firm as 
the combination of financial risk and business risk constrained by the “maximum tolerable total 
risk.” How this tolerable level of total risk is calculated is not explicitly stated in the paper but is 
assumed to be determined when optimizing profit subject to total risk.  
Collins (1985) presents an alternative model that is consistent with the risk balancing 
framework put forward by Gabriel and Baker (1980). Collins suggests a structural model of the 
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debt-equity decision faced by a firm. Maximizing the equation provides us with relationships 
between different components of risk that are found in Gabriel and Baker’s model.  
Featherstone et al. (1988) develop a theoretical framework of risk balancing by 
constructing a mean-variance model to determine the optimal leverage for a firm. Comparative 
statistic analysis carried out on the model provides results consistent with the previous risk 
balancing literature. Featherstone et al. (1988) find that policies aimed at reducing the variability 
of return on assets, or business risk, increase the variance of return on equity through increased 
leverage, or financial risk. They find that business risk-reducing policies increase the probability 
of a firm losing all or part of their equity capital and going bankrupt due to the increase in optimal 
leverage. 
The common approach to empirical risk balancing analysis is through correlation analysis 
and regression analysis with panel data to estimate adjustments in risk measures across time. 
Several empirical papers approach risk balancing directly by examining business risk and financial 
risk explicitly, while others provide evidence of risk balancing though specific farm-level 
behavioural adjustments. Escalante and Barry (2003) approach risk balancing directly by 
conducting correlation analysis on business and financial risk measures for a sample panel of 
Illinois grain farmers. They find that risk balancing is most evident when using a business risk 
measure that only accounts for the previous two years. De Mey et al. (2014) and Uzea et al. (2014) 
apply correlation and regression analysis on a panel of farms from the EU-15 and Ontario, Canada, 
respectively. De Mey et al. (2014) find evidence of risk balancing through both methods with 
regression results showing that financial risk adjusts following a change in business risk. Uzea et 
al. (2014) find just over half their sample displays risk balancing behaviour, but their regressions 
results find no evidence of year-over-year financial risk adjustment.  
Of the papers that touch on risk balancing implicitly, there are several that examine how 
risk-related agricultural programs and policies affect risk-related farm behaviour. Coble et al. 
(2000) examine how crop and revenue insurance affect the level of hedging for US corn producers, 
where hedging can be seen as an alternative risk management tool. They find that crop insurance 
is complementary to hedging while pure revenue insurance has a strong substitution effect and 
therefore reduces the demand for hedging. Turvey (2012) looks at the optimal crop choice faced 
by a representative sample of Manitoba producers under whole farm revenue insurance. Using 
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simulated data, Turvey (2012) finds that whole farm income insurance with subsidised premiums 
can affect producers' choice of crops. Uzea et al. (2014) and Ifft et al. (2015) look at the effect of 
insurance on the different measures of financial risk. Uzea et al. (2014) find enrolment in federal 
margin insurance programs to be correlated with an increase in financial risk, measured by interest 
expenses over total operating revenue, for crop and beef producers. Ifft et al. (2015) use propensity 
score matching on a representative sample of US farms to estimate the difference in debt levels for 
operations that participate in federal crop insurance programs and those that do not. They find 
federal crop insurance program participation to be correlated with short-term farm debt, but not 
long-term farm debt. These empirical studies allude to risk balancing behaviour as they find that 
participation in risk-reducing programs like insurance may lead to adjustments in risk-related farm 
behaviour such as the use of risk-reducing tools or the decision to take on more debt. 
2.3 Investment Decision and Risk 
Investment under uncertainty is a well-researched topic with many studies examining the 
adverse effects of uncertainty on investment behaviour (e.g., Baum et al., 2010; Bloom et al. 2007; 
Boyle and Guthrie, 2003; Doshi et al., 2017; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011). While there is a 
vast literature on investment and uncertainty, the focus of this section is to review literature that is 
relevant to the agricultural industry. Empirical studies of farm investment behaviour are reviewed 
to guide the methodology and motivate the risk balancing relationship between BRM program 
enrolment and investment. 
Uncertainty can stem from policy, interest rates, rate of return, and cash flow, all of which 
can affect investment. The effect of uncertainty on investment behaviour can be ambiguous if the 
source of uncertainty is not specified (e.g., Baum et al., 2010; Boyle and Guthrie, 2003). Baum et 
al. (2010) look at the US manufacturing sector and examine the linkages between uncertainty 
derived from a firm's stock return, overall market uncertainty, and capital investment behaviour. 
Their results show that uncertainty or volatility in the market has a direct negative effect on fixed 
capital investment spending. They also find that uncertainty derived from a firm's own returns 
effects investment through cash flow, while the sign of the effect may vary. Caballero and Pindyck 
(1996) use the firm-level US to find higher industry-wide uncertainty, defined by the variance of 
the marginal revenue product of capital, raises the required rate of return on capital for an 
investment to occur. Ghosal and Loungani (2000) use industry-level data to find that uncertainty 
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of profits for US firms decreases expenditure on investment, with the negative effect on investment 
more substantial for industries consisting of smaller firms. 
There are several recent empirical studies examining investment behaviour and income 
stabilizing agriculture programs. Heikkinen and Pietol (2009) model optimal investment behaviour 
and cost of uncertainty using a dynamic stochastic programming model. They find that uncertainty 
costs are dependant on future income variability, therefore affecting the decision to invest, as well 
as timing. In some cases, greater future income variability is found to increase an option value of 
postponing an investment. Their analysis is motivated by cases of policy uncertainty causing the 
rate of return of investment to be uncertain for Finnish farmers. 
Sckokai and Moro (2009) apply a dynamic dual model of choice under uncertainty, 
allowing for farmers' risk attitudes, to evaluate the effect of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
BRM programs on farm investment behaviour. A dataset of Italian crop farmers is used to 
parameterise a normalised quadratic multi-period expected utility function. The resulting 
investment demand equation and supply equations are then used to simulate the effect of different 
policies on the demand for investment. They find that farm investment is positively affected by 
price intervention policies due to reduced price volatility. Policies unrelated to output price 
uncertainty have a smaller effect on investment behaviour. Their results show that uncertainty 
surrounding expected profit, and thus policies that effect uncertainty, can affect investment 
behaviour. 
Kallas et al. (2012) use a reduced-form application of the model by Sckokai and Moro 
(2009) to evaluate the effect of CAP direct payment programs based on historical yields on 
investment behaviour. The model is applied to a dataset of cereal, oilseed, and protein producers 
in Spain. They find evidence that program payments affect investment decision positively for 
buildings, land improvements, machinery, and equipment. Their analysis also finds crop insurance 
contracts increase investment through its reduction in revenue uncertainty. 
Investment can be affected by financial constraints or credit accessibility which, in turn, 
can be closely linked to risk faced by agricultural operations. Minton and Schrand (1999) find cash 
flow volatility to increase the cost and likelihood of accessing capital markets for US firms using 
firm-level data. Their results suggest that firms forgo investment rather than access external capital 
markets to cover cash flow deficits. Hughes et al. (1984) estimate the effect of federal credit 
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subsidies on the financial structure and investment behaviour of US farms. Simulations are 
conducted using a baseline model which is estimated using 1976 to 1980 data. They find a small 
decrease in farm debt in the short-term and a larger decrease in the long-term with a marginal 
reduction in farm credit subsidies. Hughes et al. also find that the absence of federal credit 
subsidies translates to farmers holding fewer financial assets and owing less debt as a result. In 
other words, greater access to credit may result in more financial assets, but higher debt. Empirical 
studies have found agricultural investment to be affected by financial constraints by looking at the 
sensitivity of investment to cash-flow as a measure of financial constraints (e.g., Benjamin and 
Phimister, 2002; Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Chaddad et al., 2005). O’Toole et al. (2014) find 
similar results in the context of the Irish financial crisis using a measure of internal financial 
dependence versus external financing as a determinant of financial constraints due to criticisms of 
the cash-flow measure. These results imply that credit accessibility can influence investment and 
the level of financial risk of an agricultural operation.  
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3 THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1 Risk Balancing Model 
This paper will rely on the theoretical models presented by Gabriel and Baker (1980) and 
Collins (1985). Gabriel and Baker (1980) provide a simple understanding of risk balancing 
behaviour using a risk constraint, while Collins (1985) represents risk balancing in a structural 
equation of the debt-equity decision made by the farm business to maximize the expected utility 
of wealth. Both approaches yield results that are consistent with the hypothesized positive 
relationship between BRM program enrolment and investment but provide different interpretations 
of risk measures. 
The total risk a business faces can be separated into the two distinct components of business 
risk (BR) and financial risk (FR). Gabriel and Baker (1980) define BR as the inherent risk in the 
farms operating performance, independent of how it is financed. The risk associated with weather 
or commodity prices are typical examples of BR in agriculture. FR is defined as the added risk 
associated with how an operation finances its debt. Interest rate risk, credit risk, and other risks 
associated with leverage fall under FR. For example, if an operation's fixed debt obligations 
increase due to movements in interest rates, FR has increased. 
The model below, put forward by Gabriel and Baker (1980), is an equation capturing a 
firm’s BR and FR to which a risk constraint, 𝛽, is applied. The risk constraint is assumed to be 
optimal for the specific operation. This relies on the assumption that a firm is maximizing their 
objective function subject to the total risk constraint rather than the components separately (Gabriel 
and Baker, 1980). 
𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼
𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼]
+ (
𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼
𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼]
∗
𝐼
(𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼] − 𝐼)
) ≤ 𝛽 (3.1) 
 
𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼] is the firm’s expected net operating income while 𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼 represents the variability 
of net operating income. Both are independent of the way the firm is financed. 𝐼 represents fixed 
debt obligations or payments. The first term in Equation (3.1) represents BR and is independent of 
FR. BR becomes greater as the variability of net operating income increases and decreases as 
BR FR 
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expected net operating income increases. The second term in brackets represents FR, defined as 
the interaction between 
𝐼
(𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼]−𝐼)
 and 
𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼
𝐸[𝑁𝑂𝐼]
. FR can be interpreted as the added risk to an 
operation’s net operating income due to fixed debt obligations. As fixed debt obligations increase, 
so does FR. In this model, it is not clear whether fixed debt obligations increase due to higher debt 
or interest rates. FR also increases with increased BR.  
The risk balancing behaviour occurs through the strategic adjustment of FR and BR 
components to maintain the optimal level of total risk or 𝛽. Consider the case of an exogenous 
reduction in 𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼 due to policy. A decrease in 𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼 reduces the first BR term as well as decreasing 
the FR term through a reduction in BR. There is now slack in the risk constraint, allowing 
adjustments in FR or BR through firm-level adjustments to increase total risk back to the optimal 
level, 𝛽.  
The risk balancing model by Collins (1985) specifies a structural equation that maximizes 
an operation's expected utility of the rate of return on equity with respect to their debt-to-asset ratio. 
The fundamental assumption of Collins' model is that a farm's primary objective is to maximize 
their expected utility of the rate of return on equity. Collins refers to BR as the variance or rate of 
return on assets. Like Gabriel and Baker (1980), FR is the added variability to the return on equity 
stemming from the operation’s leverage position. Below is the debt-equity decision, 
max
𝛿
𝐸𝑈[𝑅𝑂𝐸] = 𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐸] −
𝜌
2
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸
2 (3.2) 
where 𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐸] is the expected rate of return on equity, 𝜌 is a risk aversion parameter, and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸
2  is 
the variance of the rate of return on equity. 𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐸] is assumed to be a function of the expected 
rate of return on assets (𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴]), the fixed interest rate on debt (𝑖), and the debt-to-asset ratio (𝛿)  
as defined below. 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = (𝑅𝑂𝐴 − 𝑖𝛿)(1 − 𝛿)−1 
𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐸] = (𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴] − 𝑖𝛿)(1 − 𝛿)−1 (3.3) 
 
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸
2 = 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 (1 − 𝛿)−2 (3.4) 
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Collins assumes 𝑅𝑂𝐴  is a random variable with mean 𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴]  and variance 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 , giving 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) above which can be then substituted into the objective function defined 
in Equation (3.2).  
max
𝛿
𝐸𝑈[𝑅𝑂𝐸] = (𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴] − 𝑖𝛿)(1 − 𝛿)−1 −
𝜌
2
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 (1 − 𝛿)−2 (3.5) 
Solving for the optimal 𝛿 or leverage ratio yields us with the following equation. 
𝛿∗ = 1 −
𝜌𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2
𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴] − 𝑖
(3.6) 
Collins shows that taking the derivative of the optimal leverage ratio with respect to 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2  yields 
the following equation 
𝜕𝛿∗
𝜕𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 = −
𝜌
𝐸[𝑅𝑂𝐴] − 𝑖
< 0 (3.7) 
which implies a negative relationship between the debt-to-asset ratio (FR) and the variance of the 
rate of return on assets (BR), as long as the fixed interest rate on debt is less than the expected 
return on assets. For example, an exogenous increase in the variance of the rate of return on assets 
is hypothesized to result in a decrease in an operation's optimal debt-to-asset ratio, causing a 
downward adjustment. This negative relationship is consistent with the risk balancing framework 
introduced by Gabriel and Baker (1980).  
3.2 BRM Programs and Investment within a Risk Balancing Framework 
The risk balancing framework is used to motivate the hypothesized relationship between 
BRM program enrolment and capital investment behaviour. BRM programs and investment can 
influence the risk profile of a farm operation and can be represented in the risk balancing 
framework. Equation (3.1) and Equation (3.5) are used to show how BRM programs and 
investment can affect BR and FR within a risk balancing context. 
Before applying BRM programs and investment to the risk balancing framework, it is 
important to consider the mechanisms driving the relationship between the two. BRM programs 
can be linked to an operation’s decision to invest in several ways. Two relevant mechanisms to the 
risk balancing models are the increase in borrowing capacity and altering an operation’s ability to 
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finance debt resulting from the investment. Enrolment in BRM programs may signal to potential 
creditors good business planning and management abilities, and therefore a reduced risk of 
defaulting on their loan. BRM program enrolment can increase the amount and likelihood of credit 
available for an operation to make an investment (Hughes et al., 1984; Minton and Schrand, 1999). 
BRM programs can also increase an operation's ability to finance their debt by reducing the 
volatility of cash flow, providing an operation with consistent cash flow necessary to finance debt. 
BRM programs and investment have a positive relationship through both these mechanisms.  
Under the model presented by Gabriel and Baker (1980), both program participation and 
investment can alter components of Equation (3.1). The design of BRM programs is to reduce 
income volatility faced by farmers. Given this, program participation should reduce 𝜎𝑁𝑂𝐼 within 
the model. This reduces the BR component and part of the FR component, resulting in a reduction 
of total risk. Investment can increase 𝐼 within the FR component if investments are made through 
debt, therefore increasing the fixed debt obligations. By increasing 𝐼  through investment, FR 
increases, resulting in an increase of total risk. In Equation (3.1), BRM program participation and 
investment have opposite effects on the level of total risk. Investment and BRM program 
participation have a positive relationship within the model presented by Gabriel and Baker (1980).  
The model developed by Collins (1985) has a similar result. In Equation (3.5), BRM 
program participation should reduce the variability of the rate of return on assets (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 ), while 
investments made through debt financing will affect the debt-to-asset ratio (𝛿). Equation (3.7) 
shows that the optimal 𝛿 and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2  are negatively correlated. Therefore, a decrease in 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2 , or BR, 
through BRM program enrolment translates to an increase in the optimal 𝛿, or FR. 
 Risk balancing theory provides a basic model to explicitly show the intuitive, positive 
relationship between BRM program participation and investment behaviour, while the 
mechanisms driving the relationship are not made explicit in the models. The uncertainty of the 
mechanisms is addressed in the discussions section for the BRM program and investment analysis 
in Chapter 5.  
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4 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis is divided into three sections. First, summary statistics for the data 
are presented. Second, regression analysis is conducted to examine the relationship between BRM 
program participation and financial risk measures. Third, the relationship between BRM program 
participation and investment is empirically examined.  
The analysis is carried out across pooled samples as well as different sub-samples 
distinguished by policy period and farm type. Production insurance and margin insurance 
participation enter the models simultaneously but separately as farms can choose to participate in 
one, both, or neither of the programs.  
The analysis is applied to grain and oilseed producers, cattle operations, and a pooled 
sample. Each farm type sample, including the pooled sample, is further separated and analyzed by 
policy period. Grain and oilseed producers and cattle operations are separately examined because 
they constitute a large proportion of Canada's agricultural industry. It is also likely that different 
BRM programs will have varying effects on different operation types. For example, crop insurance 
is tailored for certain types of crop producers while margin insurance such as AgriStability is 
designed for a wider variety of operations. 
4.1 Data 
The data used for the two analysis sections is survey data from the Farm Financial Survey 
(FFS) provided through Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. The FFS provides financial data on a 
representative sample of Canadian farms across different types of agricultural operations. The data 
includes assets, liabilities, revenues, costs, capital sales, capital investments, and farm 
characteristics for each survey reference year. The reference year is either the fiscal year or 
calendar year depending on how an operation records its information.   
Available data spans from 1999 to 2015 with gaps due to changing frequency of the survey 
across the period. The period of data used for analysis spans from 2003 to 2015. During this period, 
the survey was conducted annually from 2003 to 2011, then every two years from 2011 to 2015. 
Financial data necessary for constructing variables for the BRM program and investment analysis 
is not collected for survey years 2006, 2008 and 2010. The data can be divided into two policy 
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periods. The first policy period covers the APF from 2003 to 2007 while the second policy periods 
covers Growing Forward 1 and 2 from 2008 to 2015.  
The analysis of the paper focuses on the two primary forms of BRM programs, government 
subsidized production and margin insurance, from 2003 to 2015. Private insurance alternatives to 
these BRM programs are available during this period but are not used in the analysis. This is due 
to the lack of data on private insurance enrolment and the relatively small market share these 
private options hold. AgriInvest is not examined in the analysis due to its high rate of enrolment 
in the sample. In other words, there is little variation in participation. With respect to risk 
management, part of the stated objective of AgriInvest is to help farms manage small income 
declines by encouraging them to save and receive payment for doing so (Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada, 2018). The amount of direct payment is capped at $15,000 per program year. This 
is a relatively small amount of relief in the event of a margin decline and would likely not have a 
large effect on risk related behaviour. 
A new representative sample is drawn each survey year resulting in a repeated cross-
sectional dataset. There is a roughly 30 percent overlap of survey respondents year over year, but 
they cannot be tracked across more than two survey years. The survey sample pulls farms from 
the Business Register to obtain a list of all farms in Canada. These farms are placed into a stratum 
based on province, size, and type of operation. The size of each stratum is determined by the 
revenue and assets of the farms. Simple random sample takes place at the stratum level. Sampling 
weights are applied to each farm in the sample based on the probability of selection. These weights 
are used for obtaining summary statistics of the sample and estimating models in the analysis 
section. Since this is a representative sample of Canadian farms, the composition of farms in the 
sample reflect the composition of the farm population.  
In 2013, farms with less than $25,000 in farm revenue were excluded from the sampling 
population. Farm operations in previous sample years with less than $25,000 are dropped to 
maintain a consistent sample group across survey years. 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table (4.1) provides descriptive statistics of the pooled sample used in the BRM program and 
investment analysis for the variables defined above. Descriptive statistics are given for each policy 
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period. The descriptive statistics apply to the total population of Canadian agricultural operations 
with the use of probability weights. The mean and standard deviation for each variable is estimated. 
The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample reflect statistics for the Canadian agriculture 
industry released by Statistics Canada across the sample years.1 This indicates that our sample is 
representative of Canadian farms. 
Table (4.2) provides the weighted means of the investment variables and BRM program 
enrolment for grain and oilseed producers and cattle operations by policy periods. BRM program 
enrolment rates for the APF consistent with program assessment reports published by AAFC, 
while enrolment rates during the Growing Forward policy period are slightly lower than figures 
released by AAFC for both farm types. The general reduction in enrolment between policy periods 
is consistent with the published rates.  
While investment rates between policy periods for grain and oilseed producers are 
relatively unchanged, there are notable differences between policy periods for cattle operations. 
The proportion of cattle operations making an investment based on the FFS variable decreases by 
roughly 18 percentage points from APF to Growing Forward. There is also a decrease of about 10 
percentage points for the net capital investment variable, 3 percentage points for the net machine 
investment variables, and 4.5 percentage points for the machine purchase variable.  
4.2 BRM Program Participation and Financial Risk 
Before analyzing the relationship between BRM programs and investment, the question of 
whether BRM program participation is correlated with higher FR is examined. While the 
relationship between BRM program participation and FR is motivated by risk balancing theory, it 
cannot directly represent a risk balancing relationship because BRM program participation may 
not necessarily translate to lower BR. The hypothesized positive relationship between BRM 
program participation and FR provides important context for understanding the BRM program 
participation and investment relationship. Two measures of FR requiring separate empirical 
approaches are used in the analysis. The use of two FR measures is applied for robustness. 
                                                          
1 Farms classified by farm type, historical data. Table: 32-10-0166-01. Statistics Canada 
Farms classified by size, historical data. Table: 32-10-0156-01. Statistics Canada 
Farms classified by total gross farm receipts, 2015 constant dollars, historical data. Table: 32-
10-0157. Statistics Canada 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Analysis Sample by Program Periods 
Variable APF Growing Forward Pooled Policy Period 
 Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
    
Binary Investment Variables    
FFS Investment Variable 0.587 0.569 0.579 
Net Capital Investment 0.550 0.543 0.547 
Net Machine Investment 0.471 0.448 0.461 
Machine Purchase 0.462 0.435 0.450 
    
BRM Program Participation    
Margin Insurance 0.558 0.415 0.493 
Production Insurance 0.602 0.455 0.535 
    
Covariates    
Profit Margin 0.090 
(0.721) 
0.110 
(0.580) 
0.099 
(6.657) 
Debt-to-TGR 1.251 
(2.714) 
1.306  
(3.041) 
1.276 
(2.909) 
Diversification Index 0.802 
(0.339) 
0.817 
(0.280) 
0.809 
(0.313) 
Liquidity 0.368  
(1.278) 
0.456 
(1.662) 
0.408 
(1.502) 
Yrs of Experience 28.967 
(23.050) 
31.561 
(19.921) 
30.146 
(21.734) 
    
Proportion of Sample by 
Province/Region 
   
Atlantic Canada 0.027 0.026 0.026 
Quebec 0.153 0.157 0.155 
Ontario 0.218 0.234 0.225 
Manitoba 0.096 0.091 0.094 
Saskatchewan 0.253 0.241 0.248 
Alberta 0.211 0.209 0.210 
British Columbia 0.041 0.042 0.042 
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Proportion of Sample by Revenue 
Class 
   
$25,000 to $99,999 0.397 0.312 0.358 
$100,000 to $249,999 0.293 0.247 0.272 
$250,000 to $999,999 0.266 0.338 0.298 
$1,000,000 and over 0.044 0.103 0.071 
    
Proportion of Sample by Farm 
Typea 
   
Grain & Oilseed 0.422 0.496 0.456 
Horticulture 0.075 0.084 0.079 
Dairy 0.130 0.117 0.124 
Cattle 0.307 0.252 0.282 
Hog 0.039 0.024 0.032 
Poultry 0.027 0.028 0.027 
    
Sample Size 39035 25479 64514 
a Remaining farms are coded as “Other” in the dataset. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Farm Type Samples 
Variable APF  Growing Forward  Pooled Policy Period 
 Mean Mean Mean 
    
 Grain & Oilseeds 
Binary Investment Variables    
FFS Investment Variable 0.570 0.571 0.571 
Net Capital Investment 0.539 0.552 0.545 
Net Machine Investment 0.490 0.485 0.488 
Machine Purchase 0.482 0.472 0.477 
    
BRM Program Participation    
Margin Insurance 0.658 0.469 0.565 
Production Insurance 0.846 0.600 0.725 
    
Sample Size 8601 8122 16723 
    
 Cattle 
Binary Investment Variables    
FFS Investment Variable 0.539 0.521 0.531 
Net Capital Investment 0.487 0.476 0.483 
Net Machine Investment 0.406 0.374 0.393 
Machine Purchase 0.400 0.365 0.386 
    
BRM Program Participation    
Margin Insurance 0.551 0.380 0.482 
Production Insurance 0.394 0.294 0.354 
    
Sample Size 11910 5041 16951 
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The first approach uses 
𝐼
(𝑁𝑂𝐼−𝐼)
, the percentage of fixed interest payments over net-
operation-income, as a measure of FR. This measure is consistent with the model by Gabriel and 
Baker (1980) and is used in previous empirical risk balancing analysis (De Mey et al., 2014; Uzea 
et al., 2014). To reiterate, 𝐼 is the operation's fixed interest payments or fixed debt obligations in 
the model. (𝑁𝑂𝐼 − 𝐼) is the operation’s net operating income less fixed interest payments. By 
dividing the fixed interest payments by net-operating-income, the FR measure becomes a risk 
index that can be compared across farm sizes. A greater 𝐼 or lower 𝑁𝑂𝐼 results in a higher FR level. 
This measure of FR results in farms being dropped from the sample due to zero and negative net-
operating-income values. The implications of the dropped observations on our results are touched 
on in the shortcomings section for the BRM program and FR analysis in Chapter 5. Many farms 
do not have any fixed interest payments resulting in a clustering around zero. 
Using the fixed interest payments measure of FR, a tobit model is applied due to the large 
number of FR values, the dependent variable, equal to zero. A tobit models the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable at the extensive and intensive margin separately. 
In this case, the extensive margin is whether an operation has a zero value of FR or a value greater 
than zero, while the intensive margin looks at the change in the amount of FR. The tobit model 
estimates the effect of BRM program enrolment on both these margins.  
The tobit model is defined by the following two assumptions.  
𝑦 = max(0, 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢) (4.1) 
𝑢|𝑋~𝑁(0, 𝜎2) (4.2) 
Equation (4.1) states that the dependent variable 𝑦, or FR, is a maximum of zero or a 
positive value defined by 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢, where 𝑋 are explanatory covariates, 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients, 
and 𝑢 is the unobserved error term. The zero-value corner solution reflects the distribution of FR 
using fixed interest payments over net-operation-income in the data. Equation (4.2) states that the 
distribution of the error term in Equation (4.1) is normally distributed with mean zero and some 
variance.  
The density function of a tobit is defined in Equation (4.3) below. The first and second 
term on the righthand side of the equation represent the density of the intensive and extensive 
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margin respectively. The exponent of each term is an indicator function that is equal to 1 when the 
statement inside the square brackets is true, thus separating the density of FR by zero and non-zero 
values. Θ is the normal cumulative distribution function, while 𝜃 is the normal probability density 
function. 
𝑓(𝐹𝑅|𝑋) = {Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
] 𝜎−1
𝜃 [
𝐹𝑅 − 𝑋𝛽
𝜎 ]
Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎 ]
}
1[𝐹𝑅>0]
∗  {1 − Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
]}
1[𝐹𝑅=0]
(4.3𝑎) 
The density of the tobit is represented in Equation (4.3a). The binary component of the tobit model 
is made up of Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
] in the first term, representing the probability of a non-zero value of FR, and 
the entire second term, 1 − Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
], representing the probability of FR equal to zero. These address 
the extensive margin. The uncensored linear section of the tobit is modeled by 𝜎−1
𝜃[
𝐹𝑅−𝑋𝛽
𝜎
]
Θ[
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
]
, 
representing the probability density of FR greater than zero. This addresses the intensive margin.  
Equation (4.3a) simplifies to Equation (4.3b). 
𝑓(𝐹𝑅|𝑋) = {𝜎−1𝜃 [
𝐹𝑅 − 𝑋𝛽
𝜎
]}
1[𝐹𝑅>0]
∗  {1 − Θ [
𝑋𝛽
𝜎
]}
1[𝐹𝑅=0]
(4.3𝑏) 
A sample log-likelihood expression can be derived from the density function to give us Equation 
(4.4) below. 
ℓ𝑖(𝛽, 𝜎) = 1[𝐹𝑅𝑖 > 0] (𝑙𝑛 {𝜃 [
𝐹𝑅𝑖−𝑋𝑖𝛽
𝜎
]} −
𝑙𝑛(𝜎2)
2
) + 1[𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 0]𝑙𝑛 {1 − Θ [
𝑋𝑖𝛽
𝜎
]} (4.4)
This can be rewritten as 
ℓ𝑖(𝛽, 𝜎) = 1[𝐹𝑅𝑖 = 0]𝑙𝑛 {1 − Θ [
𝑋𝑖𝛽
𝜎
]} − 1[𝐹𝑅𝑖 > 0] {
(𝐹𝑅𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽)
2
2𝜎2
+
𝑙𝑛(𝜎2)
2
} 
The complete log-likelihood function is 
𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ ℓ𝑖(𝛽, 𝜎)
𝑛
𝑖=1
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with 𝑛 being the number of observations in the population. Using maximum likelihood estimation, 
values of 𝛽 and 𝜎 that maximize the equation above provide our estimates. Estimators for 𝛽 and 
𝜎 are obtained through first order conditions. 
FR is the dependent variable, while the two BRM program participation variables are the 
covariates of interest. Other variables included are debt-to-total gross revenue, profit margin, an 
income diversity index, a liquidity measure, and manager’s years of experience. These variables 
are included to control for other factors that may be correlated with an operation’s level of FR and 
BRM program enrolment decision. Dummy variables are included for revenue size class, province, 
farm type, and survey year to account for fixed effects. Farm types are organized into six groups: 
grain and oilseeds, horticulture (combination of potato, vegetable, fruit, greenhouse, and nursery 
operations), dairy, beef cattle, hog operations, and poultry and egg. 
The tobit model provides three marginal effect estimates: the average marginal effect of 
BRM program participation on the likelihood of a non-zero FR value, the average marginal effect 
of BRM program participation on the level of FR given a non-zero FR value, and the average 
marginal effect of BRM program participation on the level of FR across the entire sample. The 
marginal effect is the effect of BRM program enrolment relative to nonenrolment on the level or 
probability of an outcome. This is calculated for each farm operation in our sample using the 
estimated parameters from the model. Taking the average across the sample gives the average 
marginal effect. This is an average of all the individual marginal effects. 
One of the assumptions of the tobit model is that the mechanism at the extensive and 
intensive margin move in the same direction. That is, the marginal effect of BRM program 
participation on the likelihood of a non-zero FR level and its marginal effect on the level of FR 
given non-zero FR are not independent and therefore must have the same sign. This restriction of 
the tobit is clear by looking at Equation (4.3a). Both the intensive and extensive margin are 
determined by 𝑋𝛽 and 𝜎. This is an appropriate assumption since risk balancing motivates the 
mechanism driving the relationship to obtain both marginal effects. 
The second approach uses the debt-to-asset ratio of an operation as a FR measure. The 
debt-to-asset ratio is a common indicator of a firm’s financial state and is consistent with the risk 
balancing model by Collins (1985), but it does not directly translate to the framework introduced 
by Gabriel and Baker (1980). The debt-to-asset ratio allows comparison across different farm sizes. 
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OLS is used to estimate the linear model defined by Equation (4.5) with the FR measure as the 
dependent variable and BRM program participation as the covariates of interest. The other 
variables included in the model, 𝑋𝑖 in the Equation (4.5), are the same as those included in the tobit 
model using the fixed interest payments measure of FR.  
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝑒 (4.5) 
The same general hypothesis applies to both approaches: BRM program participation is 
correlated with higher levels of FR, ceteris paribus. Under the tobit model approach, the hypothesis 
is extended to state that BRM program participation is correlated with an increase in the likelihood 
of a non-zero value of FR.  
4.3 BRM Program Participation and Investment Analysis 
 The relationship between BRM program participation and investment behaviour is 
explored by looking at BRM program participation and the likelihood of investment occurring. 
The risk balancing framework, paired with previous literature, provides a foundation for the 
intuitive, positive relationship between BRM programs and investment. The hypothesis of a 
positive relationship is tested by modeling the change in the probability of investment with respect 
to BRM program participation. Given the nature of the data, the decision to participate in a BRM 
program and the decision to invest occur within the same survey reference period. 
A logit model is applied to the data with the binary investment decision variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡, 
as the dependent variable. The model below states that the probability an investment occurring is 
defined by the statement on the right-hand side of the equation. BRM program participation is the 
variable of interest on the left-hand side and enters the equation as margin insurance and 
production insurance enrolment separately. Other variables included are profit margin (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚), 
debt-to-total gross revenue ratio (
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝑅
), an income diversity index (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥), liquidity (𝐿𝑖𝑞), and 
manager’s years of experience (𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝). These variables are included to account for other 
variables that may influence a farm’s BR, and factors that could affect an operation’s decision to 
invest. Dummies for province, revenue size class, farm type, and survey year are included in the 
model to account for fixed effects. 
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𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 1|𝑋) =  Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖  
     +𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽4
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝑅 𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥𝑖  
                    +𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖+𝛽7𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑘
𝐾−1
𝑘=1
(4.6) 
     + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑙
𝐿−1
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑚
𝑀−1
𝑚=1   
     + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 ) 
The profit margin variable (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚) is calculated as an operation’s net operating income 
divided by their total gross revenue. A higher operating profit margin, if sustained, effectively 
enters Gabriel and Baker’s risk balancing model negatively through in BR and increases the ability 
of an operation to finance its debt. Through this mechanism, it is expected that 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚 would be 
positively correlated with the likelihood of an investment being made. 
Debt-to-total gross revenue (
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝑅
) is calculated by dividing a farm's total debt, long term 
and short term, by their total gross revenue. The provides a measure of debt that can be compared 
across farm sizes. 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝐺𝑅
 is predicted to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of investment. 
The diversity index variable (𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑥) is a Herfindahl index that represents the diversity 
of an operation's on-farm income sources. Greater income diversity can reduce income volatility 
of an operation, reducing BR. Reduced income volatility may allow an operation to finance their 
debt consistently and is expected to be correlated with an increase in the likelihood of investing. 
The liquidity measure (𝐿𝑖𝑞) is calculated by dividing a farm’s working capital by total 
gross revenue. Working capital is an operation’s current assets over current debt. Liquidity can be 
an alternative risk management tool in the context of BR reduction. Liquid assets can be used to 
reduce income volatility, consequently allowing an increase in FR. Therefore, a larger liquidity 
measure with respect to total gross revenue is expected to be positively correlated with an increased 
likelihood of investment. 
Years of management of a farm operation (𝑀𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝) is used to capture the effect that 
farming experience may have the likelihood of investment. More years of experience may be 
correlated with lower credit constraints compared with farmers with less experience. More 
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experience could also be correlated with higher levels of capital accumulation, placing these 
farmers in a better position to invest. On the other hand, more years of experience managing a farm 
may be correlated with greater risk aversion or an aversion to progressive farming techniques 
requiring capital investment. Years of management experience is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of investment.  
Variables for province, revenue class, farm type, and year enter the model as categorical 
variables. Revenue class (𝑅𝑒𝑣) is included to capture large-scale effects related to the size of 
operations. They are categorized into the following four total gross revenue ranges: $25,000 to 
$99,999, $100,000 to $249,999, $250,000 to $999,999, and $1,000,000 and over. The 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 
variables capture fixed effects related to specific farm operations. The farm type categories are 
grains and oilseeds, potato, vegetable, fruit, greenhouse and nursery, dairy operations, beef cattle, 
hogs, eggs and poultry. Finally, year dummies are included to capture year-specific effects that 
may have influenced investment behaviour across the sample, capturing variables such as interest 
rates, weather, and macroeconomic fluctuations.  
The logit models the probability that an operation will invest or not invest. The binary 
response model is defined by the expressions below. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≤ 0
 
𝑦∗ = 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑒 (4.7) 
𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 1|𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑦∗ > 0|𝑋) (4.8) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 takes on the value of 1 or 0, invest or not invest. Equation (4.8) is the latent variable model 
which models the probability of a binary response. Investment occurs when 𝑦∗ is greater than zero 
and vice versa. While 𝑦∗ is not observed, it is assumed to have an expected value of 𝑋𝛽, which 
includes the covariates explained above, and an error term, 𝑒.  
The logit is derived below from Equation (4.7) and Equation (4.8). This is a generalized 
version of Equation (4.6) above.  
𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 1|𝑋) =  Φ(𝑋𝛽) 
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where the probability of an investment occurring is defined by a logistic cumulative distribution 
function, Φ, and an index defined by 𝑋𝛽. The use of a logistic cumulative distribution function 
requires the assumption that the error term from the latent variable model, Equation (4.7) has a 
logistic distribution.  
From the density of investment in Equation (4.9) 
𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖|𝑋) =  [Φ(𝑥𝑖𝛽)]
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖[1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖𝛽)]
(1−𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖) (4.9) 
we can write a sample log-likelihood function 
ℓ𝑖(𝛽) = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑛[Φ(𝑥𝑖𝛽)] + (1 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖)𝑙𝑛[1 − Φ(𝑥𝑖𝛽)] 
and then the complete log-likelihood function with 𝑛 being the number of observations in the 
population. 
𝐿(𝛽) = ∑ ℓ𝑖(𝛽)
𝑛
𝑖=1
(4.10) 
Using maximum likelihood estimation, we get estimates of 𝛽  that maximize log-likelihood 
function defined by Equation (4.10).  
The estimates of 𝛽 provide us with the marginal effects of BRM program participation on 
the likelihood of an investment being made. This model is applied to different sample groups to 
account for the possibility of varying effects across farm types and policy periods.  
It is hypothesized that BRM program participation is positively correlated with the decision 
to invest within the same survey year. A causal relationship cannot be convincingly drawn due to 
the potential endogeneity between the decision to invest and the decision to participate. 
4.3.1 Capital Investment Variables 
The investment variable chosen for the majority model specifications is the binary 
investment variable pulled directly from the FFS.1  The survey question asks the respondent 
whether they had made an on-farm capital invest during the survey period. The variable is equal 
to 1 when respondents answer ‘yes,' and 0 for ‘no.'  Alternative binary investment variables are 
                                                          
1 The question is worded “In [reference year], did this operation invest in any money in capital 
items or improvements?” (FFS, 2016) 
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created using the capital investments and capital sales data from the survey and are as follows: net 
capital investment, net machine investment, machine purchase. 
The net capital investment binary variable is based on an operation’s capital investments 
less their capital sales. When net capital investment is positive, the variable is equal to 1. When 
net capital investment is 0 or negative, the variable is set to 0. Net machine investment is similarly 
constructed, but only includes machinery related investments and sales. When machine purchases 
less machine sales is greater than 0, the variable is equal to 1 and set to 0 otherwise. The machine 
purchase variable is simply equal to 1 when machinery is purchased and 0 when it is not.  
The model is run on a pooled sample using these alternative investment variables as well 
as the primary FFS investment variable to compare and analyze the relationship across different 
forms of capital investment. Running the model using different investment variables is primarily 
a robustness test. Differences in results between the different investment variables may also 
highlight specific types of capital that are more sensitive to changes in BR or, specifically, 
enrolment in BRM programs. These differences may relate to how specific types of capital are 
financed since only investments financed through debt affect FR and are therefore relevant to the 
risk balancing framework.  
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents the results from the empirical analysis and discusses the policy 
implications and interpretations as well as shortcomings of the analysis. Results and discussions 
are first presented for the BRM program and FR analysis, followed by the BRM program 
participation and investment analysis.  
5.1 BRM Programs and Financial Risk Analysis 
Results show that BRM program participation is positively correlated with higher levels of 
FR. The positive correlation is consistent across all sample groups and periods, but there is a slight 
variation in significance. 
Table (5.1) displays the results for the tobit model using the measure of FR defined by 
fixed interest payments over NOI. Three average marginal effect estimates are provided for 
production insurance and margin insurance for each analysis sample. The estimated mean of FR 
and the estimated mean of FR given FR is greater than zero is also given for the pooled period 
analysis sample to provide context to the average marginal effect estimates. Table (5.2) provides 
the regression results for BRM programs and financial risk analysis using the debt-to-asset ratio 
using the same sample groups. 
5.1.1 Interest Payments over NOI 
The tobit model yields three different average marginal effect estimates for the two BRM 
programs analyzed for each sample. The three marginal effects are the average marginal effect of 
BRM program participation on the absolute level of FR and the level of FR given FR is greater 
than zero, and the average marginal effect of BRM program participation on the probability of a 
non-zero FR value. The marginal effect on the level of FR should be interpreted as a percentage 
point change of FR since this measure of FR is the percentage of fixed debt obligation over net 
operating income. 
The first three columns in Table (5.1) are the results for the pooled farm type sample. 
Margin and production insurance are correlated with a positive average marginal effect for all three 
marginal effect measures across the three policy period sample groups. Under the pooled policy 
period sample, margin insurance enrolment is correlated with a 10.7 percentage point increase on  
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Table 5.1: Results for Tobit Model using Fixed Debt Obligations FR Measurea 
  All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
Variable 
 APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
           
Margin 
Insurance 
AME 0.169*** 
(0.029) 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.107*** 
(0.017) 
0.160*** 
(0.042) 
0.056* 
(0.030) 
0.090*** 
(0.026) 
0.275*** 
(0.053) 
0.119*** 
(0.032) 
0.194*** 
(0.031) 
AME | non-zero FR 0.129*** 
(0.022) 
0.050*** 
(0.016) 
0.082*** 
(0.013) 
0.124*** 
(0.033) 
0.044* 
(0.024) 
0.070*** 
(0.021) 
0.215*** 
(0.042) 
0.093*** 
(0.025) 
0.151*** 
(0.024) 
AME on the probability of 
non-zero FR 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.067*** 
(0.011) 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
0.057*** 
(0.008) 
Production 
Insurance 
AME 0.093*** 
(0.029) 
0.064*** 
(0.022) 
0.082*** 
(0.017) 
0.095* 
(0.049) 
0.093** 
(0.041) 
0.099*** 
(0.032) 
0.094** 
(0.045) 
0.085** 
(0.033) 
0.104*** 
(0.030) 
AME | non-zero FR 0.071*** 
(0.022) 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.063*** 
(0.013) 
0.073* 
(0.038) 
0.073** 
(0.033) 
0.077*** 
(0.025) 
0.073** 
(0.035) 
0.066** 
(0.026) 
0.081*** 
(0.023) 
AME on the probability of 
non-zero FR 
0.021*** 
(0.010) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.014) 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Mean FR  0.590 
(0.020) 
0.410 
(0.016) 
0.496 
(0.013) 
      
Mean FR | 
non-zero FR 
 0.804 
(0.027) 
0.578 
(0.022) 
0.688 
(0.017) 
      
Sample Size  34415 29083 63498 7486 9169 16655 8551 4805 13356 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
a Covariates: debt-to-total gross revenue, profit margin, income diversity index, a liquidity measure, years of experience, revenue size 
class, province, farm type, survey year 
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Table 5.2: Results for Linear Regression Model using Debt-to-Asset Ratio FR Measure 
 All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
Variable 
APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
Margin Insurance 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.005  
(0.006) 
0.014  
(0.010) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.007  
(0.005) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Crop Insurance -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.004  
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.002  
(0.004) 
          
𝑅2 0.155 0.158 0.153 0.478 0.131 0.204 0.351 0.436 0.376 
Sample Size 46884 39067 85951 10152 12080 22232 14114 7831 21945 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
Note: Dummies controlling for fixed farm type effects are not included in the All Farm Types model. 
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the absolute level of FR, an 8.2 percentage point increase in the level of FR given FR is greater 
than zero, and a 3 percentage point increase on the probability of an operation having FR at all. 
Production insurance enrolment is correlated with an 8.2 percentage point increase in the level of 
FR, a 6.3 percentage point increase in the level of FR given FR is greater than zero, and a 2.8 
percentage point increase in the probability of a non-zero FR level.  
The average absolute level of FR for the sample is 0.496 or about 50 percent, while the 
average FR given FR greater than zero is 0.688 or about 70 percent. With an average marginal 
effect of margin insurance on the absolute FR level of 10.7 percentage points, margin insurance 
enrolment translates to a roughly 20 percent change in FR for the average operation in the sample. 
The average marginal effect of margin insurance enrolment is about a 12 percent change in FR for 
the average operation with FR greater than zero. Production insurance enrolment translates to 
about a 16 percent change in FR for the average operation in the sample and a 9 percent change 
for the average operation with FR greater than zero, respectively. 
The average marginal effects for the level of FR are higher for the APF policy period 
relative to Growing Forward by roughly 8 to 10 percentage points for margin insurance, and about 
2 percentage points for production insurance. The average marginal effect on the probability of a 
non-zero FR level remains similar across policy periods for both BRM programs. 
Average marginal effect estimates are similar for grain and oilseed producers and cattle 
operations, but there are several notable distinctions. The average marginal effects of margin 
insurance on FR levels are slightly higher for cattle operations than those for the pooled sample 
and the grain and oilseed producers by 3 to 7 percentage points. The average marginal effect of 
margin insurance on the probability of non-zero FR is larger by almost 3 percentage points for 
cattle operations. The larger effect of margin insurance on cattle operations may be in part due to 
the lack of alternative BR management tools available to cattle operators relative to other farm 
types and the high level of capital inputs necessary for running a cattle operation.  
Another notable point is the significant marginal effect of production insurance on FR 
levels and probability of non-zero FR. In 2013, Growing Forward 2 introduced new guidelines for 
provinces to provide livestock production insurance. Prior to this, production insurance was mainly 
designed for crops and horticulture producers. Private price insurance options for livestock exist, 
but production insurance is not common. Significant results for production insurance imply cattle 
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producers may supplement their income with crop production or may be producing their feed for 
feedlot operations. 
5.1.2 Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
The estimates from the BRM programs and financial risk analysis using the debt-to-asset 
ratio as a measure of FR yield results consistent with the hypothesized relationship but are not as 
robust across the different samples. In general, BRM program participation is correlated with a 
higher level of FR. Results should be interpreted as percentage point changes to the debt-to-asset 
ratio, or FR. 
Only margin insurance is significant for the pooled farm type sample. Margin insurance 
enrolment is correlated with a 2.4, 1.6, and 2.2 percentage point increase in the level of FR for the 
APF, Growing Forward and pooled policy periods, respectively. Results for the farm-specific 
samples are distinct and unsurprising. For grain and oilseed producers, production insurance 
enrolment is correlated with a 2 to 2.9 percentage point increase in FR across the policy periods, 
while margin insurance was not significant except in the pooled policy sample at a 5% significance 
level. For cattle operations, margin insurance is correlated with a 1.2 percentage point increase for 
the APF period, and 1 percentage point increase for the pooled period sample. Production 
insurance does not have a significant effect on the level of FR for cattle producers. 
5.1.3 Summary of BRM Programs and Financial Risk Results 
The two different theoretical approaches to risk balancing by Gabriel and Baker (1980) and 
Collins (1985) yield two different measure of FR and models. Results show that BRM program 
participation is correlated with an increase in FR under both FR measures. The main distinction 
between the results of the two FR measures is the significance of increased FR associated with 
each BRM program. Higher FR is associated with margin insurance and production insurance 
participation for the pooled sample, grain and oilseed producers, and cattle operations when using 
the fixed debt obligations measure of FR. A greater magnitude in the level of FR associated with 
margin insurance is observed for cattle operations. Results from the debt-to-asset measure of FR 
vary in the significance of greater FR across samples and insurance types. Results using debt-to-
asset show greater FR is associated with production insurance for grain and oilseed producers and 
margin insurance for cattle operations.  
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5.1.4 Discussion 
 Results show that, across certain policy periods and farm type sample groups, BRM 
program participation is correlated with higher levels of FR, but it cannot be said that BRM 
programs lead farms to take on greater FR. While a causal relationship cannot be concluded from 
the results, the positive correlation between BRM program participation and higher FR provides 
policy relevant insights into the sample of BRM program participants. BRM program participants 
in the sample have higher levels of FR relative to those that do not participate. 
Policymakers should consider the distinct risk profile of participants when designing risk 
management programs if higher FR levels are a characteristic of BRM program participants, 
regardless of whether higher FR is caused by participation. The Canadian suite of BRM programs 
have been created to mitigate and manage BR but not FR. A total risk approach to risk management 
programming may be beneficial for the typical farm that would choose to enrol in a BRM program.  
5.1.5 Limitations 
5.1.5.1 Endogeneity  
Endogeneity between BRM program participation and FR levels is an issue that limits 
interpretation of the results. Causality between BRM program participation and FR cannot be 
drawn because BRM program participation is not exogenously determined. Farms enrolling 
themselves in BRM programs causes issues associated with self-selection. The sample of farms 
that choose to participate in BRM programs may consist of operations that have higher FR than 
those that do not participate. If BRM program participation and higher levels of FR are positively 
correlated with an unobserved variable that is not captured in the data, then BRM program 
participation would be correlated with higher levels of FR without program participation being the 
cause of higher FR.  
Previous empirical studies have used panel data to observe whether an increase in FR from 
one year to the next is correlated with BRM program participation or payout in the previous year, 
but this would not solve the issue of endogeneity due to self-selection (Uzea et al., 2014). Further 
research is required to find an instrument for BRM program participation that is exogenous from 
FR.  
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Moral hazard cannot be convincingly determined without strong evidence of a causal 
relationship between BRM programs and higher levels of FR. If participation in BRM programs 
is causing farms to adjust their FR upward, then moral hazard may be present among the sample 
of participant, but this cannot be determined through the analysis conducted. 
5.1.5.2 Interest Payments over NOI 
There are two issues with using the fixed debt obligations or interest payments over NOI 
measure of FR. First, interest payments of net-operating-income may not be a good measure of FR 
when only observing a cross section. NOI can fluctuate significantly for some farms year to year. 
Therefore, an observation of FR from just one year may not accurately represent a farm’s state of 
FR. The debt-to-assets measure of FR would likely fluctuate less from year to year for an 
individual farm, so the analysis using this measure can be viewed as a robustness test. 
Second, results from the tobit model may be biased due to the dropped observations. Farms 
with zero and negative values recorded for their net-operating-income are dropped because FR is 
measured by dividing fixed financial obligations by net-operating-income. If program 
participation is correlated with a higher (lower) FR level or probability of non-zero FR for farms 
with zero or negative net-operating-incomes, then the results obtained without these observations 
would be biased downward (upward). A bias would imply that farms with zero or negative net-
operating-income values behave differently than operations with positive net-operating-incomes 
after controlling for the other variables included in the model. This is plausible as there can be 
unobservable characteristics that are correlated an operation's inability to break even, the decision 
to participate in BRM programs, and the level of FR. Alternatively, zero and negative values may 
only be due to random shocks such as weather and therefore would not affect the estimates. To be 
confident in the results, they should be interpreted as reflective of operations only with positive 
net-operating-incomes.  
5.2 BRM Program Participation and Investment Analysis 
BRM program enrollment is correlated with a positive increase in the likelihood of an 
investment being made in the same survey period. The level and significance of the average 
marginal effects of BRM programs on investment vary between sample periods and types of 
operations, but results are generally robust. 
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Tables (5.3) and (5.4) provide estimates for the average marginal effect of production and 
margin insurance participation on the likelihood of an investment being made. Estimates are 
interpreted as percentage point changes in the probability of the investment outcome. The tables 
include the directional effect and significance for the non-binary control variables while the 
average marginal effects are not. Table (5.3) displays the average partial effect estimates when 
using the FFS binary investment variable. The model is run for grain and oilseed producers, cattle 
operations, and a pooled farm type sample across the APF, Growing Forward and pooled policy 
periods. Table (5.4) provides a comparison of results under alternative investment variables across 
different policy periods using only the pooled farm type sample. 
5.2.1 Farm-Type Samples with FFS Investment Variable 
The first three columns of Table (5.3) provide the estimates for the pooled farm type sample 
across different policy periods. The margin insurance enrolment is correlated with a 4.3, 1.9, and 
2.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an investment being made for the APF, Growing 
Forward, and pooled policy period, respectively. Production insurance enrolment is correlated with 
a 3.7, 4.3, and 3.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an investment being made for the 
same policy period sample groups.  
For grain and oilseed producers, average marginal effects for production insurance are 
significant, while those for margin insurance are not. Production insurance enrolment is correlated 
with a 4.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of investment for the APF policy period, and 
a 3.3 percentage point increase for the pooled policy period. The marginal effect is not significant 
for the Growing Forward policy period. These results are consistent with the BRM programs and 
FR analysis results using the debt-to-asset measure of FR which found production insurance to be 
positive and significant for grain and oilseed producers, while margin insurance was not significant.  
For cattle operations, both margin insurance and production insurance enrolment are 
correlated with an increased likelihood of investment. Margin insurance is correlated with a 9 
percentage point increase for the APF period and a 4.3 percentage point increase in the Growing 
Forward period. On the other hand, production insurance enrolment is correlated with a 2.8 
percentage point increase for the APF period and a 7.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of investment for the Growing Forward period. The magnitude of the average marginal effect for 
margin insurance decreased by roughly 5 percentage points between APF and Growing Forward, 
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 Table 5.3: BRM Program Participation and Investment Logit Results 
FFS Investment Variable All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
 APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
Variable 
          
AME of Margin 
Insurance 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.013  
(0.019) 
0.021  
(0.014) 
0.016  
(0.012) 
0.090*** 
(0.017) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
0.068*** 
(0.013) 
AME of Production 
Insurance 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.022  
(0.016) 
0.033*** 
(0.012) 
0.028** 
(0.015) 
0.077*** 
(0.021) 
0.046*** 
(0.013) 
Profit Margin (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Debt-to-TGR (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+) (+)** 
Diversity Index (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Liquidity (+)*** (+) (+)** (+)*** (+) (+)* (+) (-) (+) 
Years of Management 
Experience 
(-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
          
Categorical Variables          
Province yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Revenue Class yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Farm Type yes yes yes       
          
Sample Size 39035 25479 64514 8588 8117 16705 11902 5040 16942 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 5.4: BRM Participation and Investment Logit Results with Alternative Investment Variables 
 FFS Investment Net Capital Investment Net Machinery Investment Machine Purchase 
Variable 
APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
             
AME of 
Margin 
Insurance 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.015 
(0.010)      
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.037*** 
(0.010)   
0.022** 
(0.010)      
0.028*** 
(0.007)      
0.037*** 
(0.010)          
0.025** 
(0.010)      
0.029*** 
(0.007)      
AME of 
Production 
Insurance 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
0.044*** 
(0.007) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
0.049*** 
(0.010)      
0.045*** 
(0.007)      
0.042***     
(0.010)   
0.047*** 
(0.010)      
0.044*** 
(0.007) 
Profit Margin (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Debt-to-TGR (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Diversity 
Index 
(-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Liquidity (+)*** (+) (+)** (+)*** (+) (+)** (+)*** (+) (+)*** (+)*** (+) (+)*** 
Years of 
Management 
Experience 
(-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Categorical 
Variables 
            
Province yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Revenue Class yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Farm Type yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
             
Sample Size 39035 25479 64514 39035 25479 64514 39035 25479 64514 39035 25479 64514 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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while the average marginal effect for production insurance increased by about 5 percentage points 
between the two policy periods. The increase in the marginal effect of production insurance may 
be in part due to adjustments made to AgriInsurance following Growing Forward 2 which tailored 
the program for livestock, thus increasing its effect on BR. Alternatively, production insurance 
may have become more relevant to cattle operations' business decisions if the income share 
affected by production insurance increased. As production insurance is commonly designed for 
crops, a greater share of income arising from crop production may lead to a greater influence of 
production insurance on investment behaviour.  
The rows below the average marginal effects for the BRM programs provide the sign and 
significance of the coefficients for each non-categorical covariate, while the average marginal 
effects are not calculated.1 The sign and significance still provide interesting insights into factors 
correlated with the decision to invest. Results show that a farm's net operating income over total 
gross revenue is significant and negatively correlated with the likelihood of an investment being 
made, contrary to what was hypothesized. Higher profit margin measures may be correlated with 
higher efficiency farms which are less likely to invest. Debt-to-total gross revenue is significant 
and positively correlated with the likelihood of investment. The positive correlation is also 
contrary to the hypothesized effect, as the expected sign was negative. There is a simultaneity issue 
with this variable since investment can increase debt-to-total gross revenue when both are only 
observed in the same narrow time frame. Diversification is significant and negatively correlated 
with the likelihood of investment, while the expected sign of the diversity index coefficient was 
expected to be positive. In general, studies examining farm diversification find that farms with 
greater diversity tend to be smaller and less wealthy (Pope and Prescott, 1980; Mishra et al., 2004; 
Melhim et al., 2009). The theory that farms give up on gains from economies of scale in favour of 
risk reduction through diversity is used to explain this observation. Farms with higher 
diversification may be less likely to invest in capital to grow their operations. Liquidity is 
positively correlated with the likelihood of investment but is not significant across all sample 
groups. Liquidity is significant for the pooled farm type sample across the APF and pooled policy 
period. It is also significant for the APF policy period, and pooled policy period at the 10% 
                                                          
1Average marginal effects were not calculated due to limited time with the data and limited 
capability of the hardware used for the analysis. 
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significance level, for grain and oilseed producers. The positive correlation is consistent with the 
hypothesized sign. Liquidity is not significant for cattle operations. This may be due to how 
working capital is calculated for the liquidity measure. The current assets and current debts used 
to calculate working capital are not as relevant to livestock operations as they are to crop 
production. Year of management experience is significant and negatively correlated with 
investment, as expected. Of the categorical fixed effect variables, the coefficients for revenue class 
were consistently significant and worth noting. As revenue increases by each category, the 
magnitude of the effect on the likelihood of investment increases relative to the lowest revenue 
category.  
5.2.2 Alternative Capital Investment Variables 
Results using the alternative investment variables are consistent with the results obtained 
using the FFS investment variable. The magnitude of the average partial effects differs slightly 
from results using the FFS investment variable. The significance and sign of the other non-
categorical variables are robust across investment variables.  
While most of the results do not change, the significance of margin insurance enrolment 
on investment behaviour over the Growing Forward policy period varies across investment 
variables. Margin insurance enrolment for the Growing Forward period is correlated with a 1.9 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of investment using the FFS investment variable and is 
only significant at the 10 percent significance level. The average marginal effect for margin 
insurance is not significant over the Growing Forward period for the net capital investment 
variable, but it is significant at the 5 percent significance level using the net machinery investment 
variable and the machine purchase variable. Margin insurance is correlated with a 2.2 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of net machinery investment being positive and a 2.5 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of an operation purchasing machinery. The way machinery 
investments were financed during the Growing Forward period may explain the greater 
significance of margin insurance on machinery related investment variables relative to less specific 
investment variables. If machinery investments are commonly financed through debt, more so than 
other forms of capital, then machinery investments are more directly linked to FR, and therefore 
the FR and BRM program enrolment relationship analyzed above. 
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Production insurance generally has a larger average marginal effect than margin insurance 
across the four capital investment variables. These results may reflect how production insurance 
and margin insurance, specifically AgriStability during the Growing Forward period, are designed 
to interact. When calculating an operation’s margin to determine if they are to receive an indemnity 
from margin insurance, payouts from production insurance are included as revenue. This means 
that a payout from production insurance reduces the likelihood of a payout from margin insurance. 
The lower likelihood of a payout from margin insurance when an operation is also enrolled in 
production insurance may reduce the effect of margin insurance on investment behaviour.  
5.2.3 Discussion 
5.2.3.1 Causal Relationship between BRM Program Participation and Investment  
It is difficult to isolate the effect of BRM programs on FR and investment due to the self-
selection of BRM program participants and the timing of participation and investment decisions. 
The risk balancing theory states that in the event of an exogenous shock to a component of total 
risk, a different component will adjust to maintain the accepted level of total risk (Gabriel and 
Baker, 1980). Neither BRM program participation or capital investment can be considered as 
exogenous shocks to a firm's total risk portfolio. The risk balancing framework can provide insight 
into how BR and FR adjust due to program participation and investment decisions, but a causal 
relationship between the variables is difficult to draw without exogenous shocks that effect BRM 
program participation or investment. The analysis conducted in this paper cannot show that a 
reduction in BR due to program participation caused FR though investment to increase. Likewise, 
it cannot show that an increase in FR due to investment caused BR to decrease due to subsequent 
program participation.  
The timing of BRM program participation and investment decision makes it difficult to 
isolate a causal effect of BRM program participation on investment behaviour and vice versa. The 
data is in the form of repeated cross-sections with a new sample selected each survey year. We can 
see whether an operation enrolled in a BRM program and made an investment sometime within 
the survey reference year, but we cannot tell when within this period each decision was made. The 
deadline for enrolling in margin insurance and production insurance is generally in April or early 
May. Investment can happen before or after enrolment within the survey reference year. That said, 
panel data or other data where the specific timing of investment and BRM program participation 
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is known may not solve the problem. The decision to invest or participate is not necessarily made 
at the time investment, or enrollment occurs. 
As stated above, neither investment or BRM program enrolment are exogenously 
determined for a farm. The decision to participate in a BRM program and the decision to invest 
may be a joint decision, even if one decision is executed before the other. For example, an 
operation intending on making a large investment may take steps to ensure a level of income to 
finance the resulting debt and enrol in a BRM program. Similarly, knowing that BRM programs 
are available, an operation may be encouraged to invest. With panel data, the order of BRM 
program enrolment and investment occurring could be known but would not necessarily prove a 
causal relationship.  
5.2.3.2 BRM Programs Help Farms that Invest 
 The policy-relevant interpretation of the results is that BRM programs help farms that want 
to invest. A multitude of factors in agriculture determine investment behaviour, and while there is 
evidence that income volatility, or BR, is a factor in the likelihood and level of capital investment 
made by farms, it is unlikely to be the driving factor for investment. BRM programs are designed 
to reduce income volatility which can facilitate investment through mechanisms discussed above 
such as credit availability and the ability to finance debt. Farms that want to invest may enrol in 
BRM programs while BRM programs may provide the opportunity for a farm to invest. This 
interpretation does not speak to causality which is consistent with the empirical analysis. The 
positive correlation between BRM program participation and investment indicates that farm 
operators who are enrolled in BRM programs are more likely to invest without implying a causal 
relationship. In this context, BRM programs do more than fulfil their short-term purpose of 
managing business risk. BRM programs are tools that can be used when making business decisions 
such as investment. BRM programs can have policy implications regarding growth and innovation 
within the agricultural industry.   
5.2.3.3 Perceived Business Risk Reduction through BRM Programs 
While this paper does not directly address risk balancing behaviour in the empirical 
analysis, it is worth discussing risk balancing within the BRM program and investment relationship. 
Under a risk balancing framework, BRM program participation can be viewed as a reduction in an 
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operation’s BR, relative to not participating. The assumption that BRM programs reduce BR is 
needed. A weaker alternative assumption is proposed in which BRM program participation causes 
a perceived BR reduction. This weaker assumption may be sufficient to establish risk balancing if 
risk balancing is a behaviour that is not strongly rooted in financial figures. Risk balancing without 
financial analysis is an unreasonable assumption for most businesses but may be valid in the case 
of agricultural operations as there is evidence of poor business planning and record keeping among 
Canadian farms (Serecon Management Consulting Inc., 2009). If higher FR is correlated with 
perceived BR reductions, this may have negative implications for the overall financial health of 
farms. Previous studies highlight the issue of risk balancing and BRM program participation, 
finding that BRM programs may reduce the use of other risk-mitigating tools and can increase the 
likelihood of default (Featherstone et al., 1988; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2011; Uzea et al., 
2014; Vercammen, 2007). This paper takes the view that benefits from risk balancing can arise 
through investment, but if BRM program participation does not reduce BR, the potential benefits 
from an investment may be outweighed by the increase in total risk due to increased FR without 
the offsetting reduction in BR.  
5.2.4 Limitations 
5.2.4.1 Observed Variables and Correlation 
As the data is repeated cross-sections, BRM program enrolment and investment occurring 
outside of the survey year for a specific farm operation will not be observed. Therefore, the 
correlation between BRM program enrolment and investment is only observed when both occur 
within the same survey year. This is a shortcoming of the analysis as the relationship between the 
two decisions would not be restricted by this survey reference period. Panel data may help solve 
this problem by expanding the period in which BRM program participation and investment can be 
observed, but the determining a limit to this period would require further research.  
5.2.4.2 Endogeneity 
Two endogeneity issues may present in the analysis. One is due to omitted variables and 
the other due to simultaneity. Endogeneity may cause biased estimates of the relationship between 
BRM program enrollment and investment. 
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The models used in the analysis may omit unobservable characteristics of some operations 
that are correlated with the decision to enrol in a BRM program and the decision to invest. For 
example, operations with better-established business plans or those that use professional 
accounting firms may be more focused on growing their farm business and are therefore more 
likely to make investments. Such operations may also have better information on BRM programs 
and would be more likely to participate. Another source of endogeneity may arise from a period 
of high income for an operation prior to the observable survey year. Periods of high income may 
encourage a farm to enrol in margin insurance since their coverage is based on historical margins. 
High income periods may also increase the likelihood of investment due to increased availability 
of capital. BRM program enrolment and investment behaviour would be positively correlated to 
high income periods preceding the observable survey year and, therefore, to each other. These 
potential sources of endogeneity cause BRM program participation and investment to be correlated 
with the error term in the latent model for the logit, meaning the assumed logistic distribution of 
this error term is incorrect. The missing variable bias arises from self-selection of BRM program 
participants. 
BRM program enrolment and investment may be a joint decision, as discussed above, and 
would cause a simultaneity issue. Estimating a model with investment as the dependent variable 
and BRM program enrolment as the independent variable will cause BRM program enrolment to 
be correlated with the error term, possibly biasing the results. 
5.3 Evaluating Results with respect to Policy Goals 
As BRM programs are a policy tool, the question arises of whether the results of this paper 
align with the stated policy goals. This paper does not investigate the primary goal of reduced 
income volatility, but it does address two specific general principles of risk management 
programming stated in the framework agreement for Growing Forward. The first general principle 
stated that “programs should minimize moral hazard” (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008). 
Moral hazard refers to the change in behaviour when faced with a reduction in risk. This paper 
finds that BRM program participation is correlated with higher levels of FR and an increase in the 
likelihood of an investment being made. Moral hazard cannot definitively be said to exist without 
establishing a causal relationship between BRM program participation and higher levels of FR or 
investment behaviour.  
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The second general principle stated that “programs should contribute to market-oriented 
adjustments and adoption of technological innovations” (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
2008). Although we cannot tell if the capital investments in our sample are in technological 
innovations, it is feasible that some are, especially machine investments. In the context of larger 
agricultural policy initiatives of innovation and growth, the positive correlation between BRM 
program enrolment and investment behaviour provides evidence that BRM programs are aligned 
with such policy goals.  
Further analysis may be done to determine whether an investment is financed through debt, 
therefore effecting an operation’s level of FR. Analysis of productivity gains due to investments 
financed through debt may provide better evidence of the long-term benefits of BRM programs 
such as increased productivity and efficiency. Possible capitalization of these productivity gains 
could be addressed as well. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Studies have shown that Canadian BRM programs are likely fulfilling their primary role 
of reducing BR faced by agricultural producers (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2012; Uzea 
et al., 2014). Through risk balancing behaviour, reductions in BR through BRM program 
enrolment may be correlated with other risk influencing farm behaviour. While previous studies 
frame BRM programs and risk balancing as having neutral or even negative consequences 
regarding farm behaviour and risk, this paper finds BRM program enrolment to be correlated with 
increased likelihood of investment. The positive relationship between BRM program enrolment 
and investment has implication for farm’s productivity, long-term financial health, and growth.  
A causal effect cannot be drawn between BRM program enrolment and investment 
behaviour based on the analysis. BRM programs are self-enrolled programs that can be factored 
into many farm-level decisions, with enrollment as a farm-level decision itself. BRM program 
enrolment is very likely an endogenous decision, so a unidirectional causal effect on investment 
would not be a policy-relevant measure as it does not capture the entire relationship between the 
two variables. While we cannot say how one directly affects the other, the positive correlation 
between BRM program enrolment and investment behaviour highlights that policies targeted at 
one aspect of the agricultural industry may be indirectly related to others. In the case of agricultural 
BRM programs, policymakers should keep in mind the linkages between factors that influence 
risk, as well as farm-level decisions that are influenced by risk.  
Despite data limitations and shortcomings of the analysis, this paper provides evidence of 
a positive relationship between BRM program enrolment and investment behaviour. The indirect 
effects of adjusting risk on farm-level behaviour and decision-making are important to consider 
when designing policy and evaluating existing programs. It is also important to consider the 
context in which farm decisions are viewed as the relationship between BRM program enrolment 
and investment can be viewed as an example of moral hazard or farms optimizing their business 
through risk management tools. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Coefficients for Tobit Model using Fixed Debt Obligations FR Measure 
 All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
Variable APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
          
Margin Insurance 0.366*** 
(0.064) 
0.143*** 
(0.049) 
0.234*** 
(0.039) 
0.353*** 
(0.096) 
0.132* 
(0.075) 
0.206*** 
(0.063) 
0.619*** 
(0.126) 
0.258*** 
(0.070) 
0.435*** 
(0.072) 
Production Insurance 0.201*** 
(0.063) 
0.140*** 
(0.051) 
0.180*** 
(0.039) 
0.209* 
(0.110) 
0.220** 
(0.104) 
0.227*** 
(0.077) 
0.211** 
(0.103) 
0.184** 
(0.072) 
0.233*** 
(0.068) 
Profit Margin -5.091*** 
(0.295) 
-3.492*** 
(0.270) 
-4.306*** 
(0.194) 
-4.702*** 
(0.525) 
-3.563*** 
(0.560) 
-4.080*** 
(0.377) 
-4.571*** 
(0.403) 
-3.007*** 
(0.274) 
-3.863*** 
(0.259) 
Diversity Index -0.434*** 
(0.132) 
-0.172** 
(0.079) 
-0.297*** 
(0.076) 
-0.470*** 
(0.179) 
-0.417*** 
(0.132) 
-0.438*** 
(0.108) 
-0.239 
(0.218) 
0.175 
(0.143) 
-0.068 
(0.139) 
Debt-to-TGR 0.753*** 
(0.065) 
0.477*** 
(0.084) 
0.584*** 
(0.053) 
0.679*** 
(0.102) 
0.553*** 
(0.170) 
0.588*** 
(0.104) 
0.842*** 
(0.119) 
0.401*** 
(0.056) 
0.590*** 
(0.065) 
Liquidity -0.442*** 
(0.068) 
-0.170*** 
(0.036) 
-0.277*** 
(0.045) 
-0.461*** 
(0.118) 
-0.203*** 
(0.055) 
-0.298*** 
(0.063) 
-0.306*** 
(0.085) 
-0.166*** 
(0.057) 
-0.252*** 
(0.057) 
Years of Management Experience -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
          
Province (Base: Ontario)          
Atlantic Canada 0.255*** 
(0.086) 
0.292*** 
(0.074) 
0.274*** 
(0.057) 
0.544* 
0.328) 
0.144 
(0.188) 
0.191 
(0.164) 
0.858*** 
(0.217) 
0.325** 
(0.133) 
0.635*** 
(0.138) 
Quebec 0.009 
(0.082) 
0.103** 
(0.044) 
0.062 
(0.045) 
0.105 
(0.138) 
0.071 
(0.090) 
0.083 
(0.077) 
0.590*** 
(0.166) 
0.200* 
(0.108) 
0.382*** 
(0.097) 
Manitoba 0.546*** 
(0.109) 
0.344*** 
(0.078) 
0.445*** 
(0.066) 
0.206 
(0.133) 
0.258* 
(0.134) 
0.231** 
(0.094) 
1.335*** 
(0.248) 
0.465*** 
(0.113) 
0.965*** 
(0.150) 
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Saskatchewan 0.677*** 
(0.121) 
0.436*** 
(0.086) 
0.559*** 
(0.073) 
0.446*** 
(0.169) 
0.462*** 
(0.175) 
0.465*** 
(0.122) 
1.302*** 
(0.206) 
0.487*** 
(0.104) 
0.918*** 
(0.122) 
Alberta 0.260*** 
(0.081) 
0.248** 
(0.105) 
0.249*** 
(0.065) 
0.124 
(0.110) 
0.314 
(0.198) 
0.234* 
(0.122) 
0.754*** 
(0.159) 
0.217** 
(0.094) 
0.502*** 
(0.095) 
British Columbia -0.062 
(0.122) 
0.034 
(0.095) 
-0.028 
(0.074) 
0.423 
(0.257) 
0.065 
(0.277) 
0.215 
(0.195) 
0.437** 
(0.186) 
0.007 
(0.197) 
0.185 
(0.137) 
          
Revenue Class (Base: $25,000 to 
$99,999) 
         
$100,000 to $249,999 0.960*** 
(0.166) 
0.644*** 
(0.079) 
0.837*** 
(0.079) 
0.850*** 
(0.156) 
0.656*** 
(0.134) 
0.757*** 
(0.103) 
0.691*** 
(0.126) 
0.544*** 
(0.117) 
0.677*** 
(0.096) 
$250,000 to $999,999 1.320*** 
(0.162) 
0.897*** 
(0.118) 
1.177*** 
(0.113) 
1.179*** 
(0.251) 
1.094*** 
(0.242) 
1.160*** 
(0.170) 
1.138*** 
(0.244) 
0.520*** 
(0.101) 
0.893*** 
(0.152) 
$1,000,000 and over 1.593*** 
(0.220) 
1.001*** 
(0.145) 
1.357*** 
(0.140) 
1.253*** 
(0.227) 
1.195*** 
(0.300) 
1.274*** 
(0.188) 
2.057*** 
(0.575) 
0.654*** 
(0.128) 
1.348*** 
(0.282) 
          
Farm Type (Base: Grains & Oilseeds)          
Horticulture 0.045 
(0.091) 
-0.077 
(0.051) 
-0.044 
(0.050) 
      
Dairy 0.335*** 
(0.106) 
0.056 
(0.044) 
0.185*** 
(0.054) 
      
Cattle 0.405*** 
(0.078) 
0.231*** 
(0.049) 
0.329*** 
(0.046) 
      
Hog 0.190* 
(0.113) 
0.275*** 
(0.095) 
0.221*** 
(0.074) 
      
Poultry 0.119 
(0.156) 
0.016 
(0.069) 
0.038 
(0.081) 
      
          
Year (Base: changes between samples)          
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2003 Base Year        
s 
 Base Year Base Year  Base Year Base Year  Base Year 
2004 -0.174** 
(0.071) 
 -0.110* 
(0.061) 
-0.274*** 
(0.106) 
 -0.198** 
(0.094) 
-0.239* 
(0.130) 
 -0.118 
(0.103) 
2005 -0.176** 
(0.082) 
 -0.106 
(0.074) 
-0.251*** 
(0.121) 
 -0.154 
(0.111) 
-0.236* 
(0.139) 
 -0.138 
(0.120) 
2006 -0.024 
(0.097) 
 0.045 
(0.092) 
-0.040 
(0.164) 
 0.039 
(0.180) 
-0.025 
(0.158) 
 0.082 
(0.147) 
 2007 -0.124 
(0.077) 
 -0.066 
(0.066) 
-0.128 
(0.108) 
 -0.088 
(0.103) 
-0.112 
(0.146) 
 0.025 
(0.125) 
2008  Base Year -0.187** 
(0.083) 
 Base Year -0.149 
(0.146) 
 Base Year -0.198 
(0.122) 
2009  -0.036 
(0.072) 
-0.177*** 
(0.060) 
 0.027 
(0.117) 
-0.078 
(0.092) 
 0.035 
(0.119) 
-0.109 
(0.116) 
2010  -0.119* 
(0.071) 
-0.259*** 
(0.060) 
 -0.113 
(0.121) 
-0.206** 
0.085) 
 0.002 
(0.128) 
-0.133 
(0.128) 
2011  -0.233** 
(0.093) 
-0.422*** 
(0.067) 
 -0.291 
(0.178) 
-0.433*** 
(0.100) 
 -0.184* 
(0.110) 
-0.382*** 
(0.116) 
2013  -0.312*** 
(0.091) 
-0.505*** 
(0.067) 
 -0.267 
(0.164) 
-0.404*** 
(0.097) 
 -0.274*** 
(0.102) 
-0.455*** 
(0.114) 
2015  -0.182*** 
(0.084 
-0.350*** 
(0.066) 
 -0.167 
(0.173) 
-0.296*** 
(0.104) 
 -0.140 
(0.101) 
-0.271*** 
(0.104) 
          
Constant -0.213 
(0.222) 
-0.086 
0.181) 
-0.087 
(0.164) 
0.333 
(0.299) 
-0.034 
(0.335) 
0.205 
(0.269) 
-0.809** 
(0.385) 
-0.065 
(0.214) 
-0.342 
(0.234) 
          
Sample Size 34415 29083 63498 7486 9169 16655 8551 4805 13356 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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Table A.2: Coefficients for Linear Regression Model using Debt-to-Asset Ratio FR Measure 
 All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
Variable 
APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
          
Margin Insurance 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Production Insurance -0.003 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Profit Margin -0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.020* 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
Diversity Index 0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.0005 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
Debt-to-TGR 0.074*** 
(0.003) 
0.053*** 
(0.004) 
0.060*** 
(0.003) 
0.077*** 
(0.005) 
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
0.059*** 
(0.007) 
0.064*** 
(0.003) 
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
0.053*** 
(0.002) 
Liquidity -0.044*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.006) 
-0.058*** 
(0.011) 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
Years of Management Experience -0.003*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0001) 
          
Province (Base: Ontario)          
Atlantic Canada 0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.052*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.024 
(0.019) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
0.054*** 
(0.014) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
Quebec 0.045*** 
(0.006) 
0.047*** 
(0.009) 
0.046*** 
(0.005) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.047*** 
(0.008) 
0.055*** 
(0.011) 
0.051*** 
(0.007) 
Manitoba 0.057*** 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.065*** 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.064*** 
(0.015) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
Saskatchewan 0.051*** 
(0.005) 
0.00002 
(0.007) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.065*** 
(0.007) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.050*** 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
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Alberta 0.00002 
(0.005) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
British Columbia -0.042*** 
(0.006) 
-0.054*** 
(0.011) 
-0.050*** 
(0.006) 
0.027 
(0.021) 
0.0003 
(0.024) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-0.053*** 
(0.009) 
-0.045*** 
(0.006) 
          
Revenue Class (Base: $25,000 to 
$99,999) 
         
$100,000 to $249,999 0.072*** 
(0.004) 
0.058*** 
(0.006) 
0.065*** 
(0.004) 
0.062*** 
(0.006) 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.008) 
0.069*** 
(0.005) 
0.075*** 
(0.005) 
$250,000 to $999,999 0.124*** 
(0.003) 
0.119*** 
(0.007) 
0.121*** 
(0.004) 
0.112*** 
(0.005) 
0.095*** 
(0.011) 
0.103*** 
(0.007) 
0.152*** 
(0.008) 
0.135*** 
(0.008) 
0.141*** 
(0.005) 
$1,000,000 and over 0.212*** 
(0.005) 
0.199*** 
(0.008) 
0.203*** 
(0.005) 
0.155*** 
(0.010) 
0.146*** 
(0.013) 
0.151*** 
(0.009) 
0.249*** 
(0.011) 
0.257*** 
(0.012) 
0.253*** 
(0.009) 
          
Year (Base: changes between samples)          
2003 Base Year  
s 
 Base Year Base Year  Base Year Base Year  Base Year 
2004 -0.002 
(0.005) 
 -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
 0.007 
(0.009) 
0.0001 
(0.007) 
 0.003 
(0.006) 
2005 -0.012*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
 -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
2006 -0.012** 
(0.005) 
 -0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
 -0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
 -0.011 
(0.010) 
 2007 -0.018*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
 -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.029*** 
(0.007) 
2008  Base Year -0.022*** 
(0.005) 
 Base Year -0.028*** 
(0.007) 
 Base Year -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
2009  -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
 0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
 -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.032*** 
(0.006) 
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2010  -0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
 0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.006) 
2011  -0.025*** 
(0.005) 
-0.045*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.038*** 
(0.006) 
-0.058*** 
(0.006) 
2013  -0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.044*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.047*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.051*** 
(0.007) 
2015  -0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.038*** 
(0.011) 
 0.003 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
 -0.051*** 
(0.008) 
-0.070*** 
(0.007) 
          
Constant 0.109*** 
(0.010) 
0.130*** 
(0.011) 
0.136*** 
(0.008) 
0.094*** 
(0.018) 
0.128*** 
(0.020) 
0.137*** 
(0.017) 
0.126*** 
(0.014) 
0.142*** 
(0.014) 
0.148*** 
(0.010) 
          
Sample Size 46884 39067 85951 10152 12080 22232 14114 7831 21945 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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Table A.3: Coefficients for BRM Program Participation and Investment Logit 
FFS Investment Variable All Farm Types Grains & Oilseeds Cattle 
 APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
Variable 
          
Margin Insurance 0.194*** 
(0.046) 
0.087* 
(0.045) 
0.133*** 
(0.032) 
0.060 
(0.087) 
0.098 
(0.068) 
0.075 
(0.053) 
0.380*** 
(0.073) 
0.186** 
(0.084) 
0.292*** 
(0.055) 
Production Insurance 0.169*** 
(0.044) 
0.200*** 
(0.047) 
0.179*** 
(0.032) 
0.220** 
(0.090) 
0.103 
(0.073) 
0.154*** 
(0.057) 
0.121* 
(0.066) 
0.335*** 
(0.094) 
0.195*** 
(0.054) 
Profit Margin -0.206*** 
(0.049) 
-0.223*** 
(0.054) 
-0.209*** 
(0.036) 
-0.340*** 
(0.107) 
-0.330*** 
(0.099) 
-0.330*** 
(0.073) 
-0.194*** 
(0.061) 
-0.307*** 
(0.090) 
-0.233*** 
(0.050) 
Diversity Index 0.056*** 
(0.013) 
0.046*** 
(0.010) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.065** 
(0.029) 
0.061*** 
(0.017) 
0.060*** 
(0.015) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
0.029** 
(0.013) 
Debt-to-TGR -0.721*** 
(0.093) 
-0.812*** 
(0.104) 
-0.752*** 
(0.069) 
-0.713*** 
(0.161) 
-0.790*** 
(0.159) 
-0.744*** 
(0.113) 
-0.598*** 
(0.142) 
-0.591*** 
(0.187) 
-0.593*** 
(0.113) 
Liquidity 0.113*** 
(0.030) 
0.021 
(0.020) 
0.053** 
(0.022) 
0.192*** 
(0.059) 
0.036 
(0.046) 
0.091* 
(0.047) 
0.057 
(0.038) 
-0.018 
(0.026) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
Years of Management Experience -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
          
Province (Base: Ontario)          
Atlantic Canada 0.351*** 
(0.056) 
0.066 
(0.070) 
0.222*** 
(0.044) 
-0.307 
(0.252) 
-0.381 
(0.301) 
-0.327 
(0.228) 
0.223** 
(0.107) 
0.003 
(0.176) 
0.136 
(0.095) 
Quebec 0.059 
(0.059) 
-0.109* 
(0.058) 
-0.024 
(0.041) 
0.003 
(0.115) 
-0.071 
(0.104) 
-0.028 
(0.077) 
0.108 
(0.110) 
-0.124 
(0.136) 
0.007 
(0.085) 
Manitoba 0.088 
(0.067) 
0.108 
(0.074) 
0.093* 
(0.050) 
0.146 
(0.109) 
-0.001 
(0.102) 
0.070 
(0.075) 
-0.156 
(0.116) 
0.280* 
(0.148) 
0.029 
(0.092) 
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Saskatchewan 0.130 
(0.062) 
0.019 
(0.061) 
0.080* 
(0.044) 
0.166* 
(0.092) 
-0.006 
(0.081) 
0.085 
(0.062) 
-0.001 
(0.106) 
0.050 
(0.125) 
0.020 
(0.080) 
Alberta 0.193*** 
(0.054) 
0.033 
(0.063) 
0.123*** 
(0.041) 
0.214** 
(0.092) 
0.012 
(0.095) 
0.114* 
(0.066) 
0.131 
(0.088) 
0.137 
(0.110) 
0.140** 
(0.069) 
British Columbia 0.074 
(0.059) 
-0.251*** 
(0.079) 
-0.077 
(0.048) 
0.100 
(0.207) 
-0.671** 
(0.307) 
-0.325 
(0.206) 
0.235** 
(0.111) 
0.300* 
(0.169) 
0.264*** 
(0.095) 
          
Revenue Class (Base: $25,000 to 
$99,999) 
         
$100,000 to $249,999 0.584*** 
(0.049) 
0.659*** 
(0.055) 
0.618*** 
(0.036) 
0.752*** 
(0.080) 
0.778*** 
(0.082) 
0.762*** 
(0.058) 
0.483*** 
(0.071) 
0.482*** 
(0.093) 
0.479*** 
(0.057) 
$250,000 to $999,999 1.108*** 
(0.052) 
1.293*** 
(0.055) 
1.196*** 
(0.038) 
1.419*** 
(0.088) 
1.521*** 
(0.082) 
1.463*** 
(0.060) 
0.710*** 
(0.084) 
1.008*** 
(0.109) 
0.854*** 
(0.068) 
$1,000,000 and over 1.587*** 
(0.070) 
1.927*** 
(0.070) 
1.778*** 
(0.050) 
2.012*** 
(0.202) 
2.320*** 
(0.124) 
2.225*** 
(0.103) 
1.051*** 
(0.137) 
1.058*** 
(0.153) 
1.046*** 
(0.104) 
          
Farm Type (Base: Grains & Oilseeds)          
Potato -0.153 
(0.104) 
-0.309*** 
(0.116) 
-0.232*** 
(0.077) 
      
Vegetable -0.024 
(0.094) 
-0.264** 
(0.109) 
-0.154** 
(0.070) 
      
Fruit 0.146* 
(0.075) 
-0.246*** 
(0.081) 
-0.058 
(0.055) 
      
Greenhouse & Nursery -0.132 
(0.090) 
-0.359*** 
(0.101) 
-0.266*** 
(0.068) 
      
Dairy 0.658*** 
(0.080) 
0.305*** 
(0.075) 
0.490*** 
(0.055) 
      
Cattle 0.053 
(0.049) 
0.082 
(0.054) 
0.059 
(0.036) 
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Hog -0.223*** 
(0.074) 
-0.704*** 
(0.082) 
-0.418*** 
(0.055) 
      
Poultry -0.169*** 
(0.078) 
-0.496*** 
(0.078) 
-0.342*** 
(0.055) 
      
          
Year (Base: changes between samples)          
2003 Base Year        
s 
 Base Year Base Year  Base Year Base Year  Base Year 
2004 -0.068 
(0.059) 
 -0.037 
(0.056) 
-0.113 
(0.109) 
 -0.126 
(0.102) 
-0.133 
(0.088) 
 -0.084 
(0.084) 
2005 -0.297*** 
(0.060) 
 -0.263*** 
(0.056) 
-0.451*** 
(0.111) 
 -0.465*** 
(0.101) 
-0.331*** 
(0.093) 
 -0.265*** 
(0.088) 
2006a Sssssssssss
sss 
        
 2007 -0.245*** 
(0.057) 
 -0.212*** 
(0.054) 
-0.417*** 
(0.102) 
 -0.425*** 
(0.093) 
-0.190** 
(0.092) 
 -0.128 
(0.088) 
2008b ssssssssssss
ss 
        
2009  Base Year -0.129** 
(0.054) 
 Base Year -0.202** 
(0.095) 
 Base Year -0.141 
(0.090) 
2010c ssssssssssss
sss 
        
2011  -0.175*** 
(0.054) 
-0.311*** 
(0.052) 
 -0.220** 
(0.090) 
-0.426*** 
(0.087) 
 -0.068 
(0.104) 
-0.226** 
(0.089) 
2013  -0.192*** 
(0.059) 
-0.319*** 
(0.057) 
 -0.194** 
(0.096) 
-0.402*** 
(0.094) 
 -0.078 
(0.113) 
-0.230** 
(0.099) 
2015  -0.270*** 
(0.056) 
-0.395*** 
(0.054) 
 -0.428*** 
(0.090) 
-0.636*** 
(0.088) 
 0.195 
(0.112) 
0.051 
(0.097) 
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Constant 0.365*** 
(0.117) 
0.570*** 
(0.0120) 
0.529*** 
(0.0) 
0.294 
(0.200) 
0.485*** 
(0.178) 
0.517*** 
(0.142) 
0.454*** 
(0.163) 
0.584*** 
(0.207) 
0.556*** 
(0.131) 
          
Sample Size 39035 25479 64514 8588 8117 16705 11902 5040 16942 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
a, b, c Omitted due to missing data for survey years 2006, 2008, 2010 
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Table A.4: Coefficients for BRM Program Participation and Alternative Investment Variables Logit 
 Net Capital Investment Net Machinery Investment Machine Purchase 
 APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled APF Growing 
Forward 
Pooled 
Variable 
          
Margin Insurance 0.184*** 
(0.045) 
0.068 
(0.044) 
0.118*** 
(0.031) 
0.163*** 
(0.046) 
0.104** 
(0.044) 
0.126*** 
(0.032) 
0.163*** 
(0.046) 
0.114** 
(0.044) 
0.131*** 
(0.032) 
Production Insurance 0.190*** 
(0.043) 
0.213*** 
(0.046) 
0.195** 
(0.031) 
0.193*** 
(0.043) 
0.225*** 
(0.046) 
0.203*** 
(0.031) 
0.186*** 
(0.043) 
0.214*** 
(0.046) 
0.195*** 
(0.031) 
Profit Margin -0.122*** 
(0.047) 
-0.219*** 
(0.054) 
-0.163*** 
(0.035) 
-0.178*** 
(0.047) 
-0.182*** 
(0.053) 
-0.176*** 
(0.035) 
-0.165*** 
(0.047) 
-0.163*** 
(0.051) 
-0.161*** 
(0.034) 
Diversity Index 0.069*** 
(0.013) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.051*** 
(0.008) 
0.042*** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.037*** 
(0.007) 
0.041*** 
(0.012) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
Debt-to-TGR -0.602*** 
(0.092) 
-0.677*** 
(0.102) 
-0.627*** 
(0.068) 
-0.689*** 
(0.092) 
-0.838*** 
(0.102) 
-0.742*** 
(0.068) 
-0.670*** 
(0.092) 
-0.836*** 
(0.101) 
-0.731*** 
(0.068) 
Liquidity 0.105*** 
(0.029) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
0.051** 
(0.022) 
0.103*** 
(0.028) 
0.040 
(0.026) 
0.065*** 
(0.022) 
0.120*** 
(0.029) 
0.044 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.023) 
Years of Management Experience -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
          
Province (Base: Ontario)          
Atlantic Canada 0.336*** 
(0.055) 
0.092 
(0.068) 
0.227*** 
(0.043) 
0.356*** 
(0.054) 
0.127* 
(0.066) 
0.256*** 
(0.042) 
0.331*** 
(0.054) 
0.084 
(0.066) 
0.223*** 
(0.042) 
Quebec 0.092 
(0.058) 
-0.071 
(0.057) 
0.012 
(0.041) 
-0.210*** 
(0.058) 
-0.301*** 
(0.058) 
-0.254*** 
(0.041) 
-0.216*** 
(0.059) 
-0.316*** 
(0.058) 
-0.264*** 
(0.041) 
Manitoba 0.080 
(0.065) 
0.125* 
(0.073) 
0.098** 
(0.049) 
0.051 
(0.065) 
0.185*** 
(0.071) 
0.109** 
(0.048) 
0.063 
(0.065) 
0.164** 
(0.071) 
0.106** 
(0.048) 
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Saskatchewan 0.094 
(0.062) 
0.035 
(0.060) 
0.069 
(0.043) 
0.089 
(0.062) 
0.092 
(0.061) 
0.092** 
(0.044) 
0.086 
(0.062) 
0.052 
(0.061) 
0.071 
(0.044) 
Alberta 0.169*** 
(0.053) 
0.035 
(0.062) 
0.114*** 
(0.040) 
0.153*** 
(0.053) 
0.111* 
(0.062) 
0.138*** 
(0.040) 
0.148*** 
(0.053) 
0.094 
(0.062) 
0.127*** 
(0.040) 
British Columbia 0.082 
(0.058) 
-0.210*** 
(0.079) 
-0.053 
(0.048) 
-0.013 
(0.058) 
-0.204** 
(0.083) 
-0.101** 
(0.048) 
-0.005 
(0.058) 
-0.187** 
(0.083) 
-0.089* 
(0.048) 
          
Revenue Class (Base: $25,000 to 
$99,999) 
         
$100,000 to $249,999 0.551*** 
(0.048) 
0.636*** 
(0.055) 
0.588*** 
(0.036) 
0.643*** 
(0.049) 
0.700*** 
(0.058) 
0.669*** 
(0.037) 
0.624*** 
(0.049) 
0.676*** 
(0.058) 
0.648*** 
(0.038) 
$250,000 to $999,999 1.000*** 
(0.051) 
1.234*** 
(0.055) 
1.113*** 
(0.037) 
1.152*** 
(0.051) 
1.335*** 
(0.057) 
1.240*** 
(0.038) 
1.142*** 
(0.051) 
1.292*** 
(0.057) 
1.214*** 
(0.038) 
$1,000,000 and over 1.501*** 
(0.066) 
1.821*** 
(0.068) 
1.674*** 
(0.048) 
1.651*** 
(0.065) 
1.945*** 
(0.068) 
1.815*** 
(0.048) 
1.589*** 
(0.065) 
1.866*** 
(0.068) 
1.747*** 
(0.047) 
          
Farm Type (Base: Grains & Oilseeds)          
Potato -0.114 
(0.101) 
-0.307*** 
(0.113) 
-0.212*** 
(0.075) 
-0.080 
(0.099) 
-0.193* 
(0.108) 
-0.140* 
(0.073) 
-0.087 
(0.098) 
-0.168 
(0.107) 
-0.131* 
(0.072) 
Vegetable 0.043 
(0.092) 
-0.253** 
(0.108) 
-0.114 
(0.070) 
-0.115 
(0.087) 
-0.304*** 
(0.102) 
-0.216*** 
(0.066) 
-0.119 
(0.087) 
-0.315*** 
(0.102) 
-0.222*** 
(0.066) 
Fruit 0.190** 
(0.073) 
-0.205** 
(0.080) 
-0.016 
(0.054) 
-0.125* 
(0.074) 
-0.496*** 
(0.082) 
-0.308*** 
(0.055) 
-0.134* 
(0.073) 
-0.508*** 
(0.082) 
-0.319*** 
(0.054) 
Greenhouse & Nursery -0.038 
(0.088) 
-0.304*** 
(0.100) 
-0.194*** 
(0.067) 
-0.541*** 
(0.085) 
-0.575*** 
(0.109) 
-0.580*** 
(0.069) 
-0.557*** 
(0.085) 
-0.660*** 
(0.111) 
-0.628*** 
(0.069) 
Dairy 0.516*** 
(0.077) 
0.263*** 
(0.073) 
0.393*** 
(0.053) 
0.305*** 
(0.073) 
0.006 
(0.070) 
0.166*** 
(0.051) 
0.306*** 
(0.072) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.166*** 
(0.051) 
Cattle -0.031 
(0.048) 
-0.029 
(0.053) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
-0.137*** 
(0.049) 
-0.158*** 
(0.054) 
-0.151*** 
(0.036) 
-0.126*** 
(0.049) 
-0.155*** 
(0.054) 
-0.144*** 
(0.036) 
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Hog -0.150** 
(0.072) 
-0.654*** 
(0.081) 
-0.354*** 
(0.055) 
-0.549*** 
(0.073) 
-1.042*** 
(0.083) 
-0.739*** 
(0.056) 
-0.543*** 
(0.073) 
-1.008*** 
(0.083) 
-0.723*** 
(0.056) 
Poultry -0.136* 
(0.077) 
-0.501*** 
(0.077) 
-0.328*** 
(0.055) 
-0.460*** 
(0.078) 
-0.754*** 
(0.080) 
-0.613*** 
(0.056) 
-0.439*** 
(0.078) 
-0.721*** 
(0.080) 
-0.586*** 
(0.056) 
          
Year (Base: changes between samples)          
2003 Base Year        
s 
 Base Year Base Year  Base Year Base Year  Base Year 
2004 -0.016 
(0.057) 
 0.018 
(0.055) 
-0.004 
(0.057) 
 0.014 
(0.055) 
0.002 
(0.057) 
 0.017 
(0.055) 
2005 -0.234*** 
(0.058) 
 -0.198*** 
(0.055) 
-0.281*** 
(0.059) 
 -0.261*** 
(0.056) 
-0.290*** 
(0.059) 
 -0.274*** 
(0.056) 
2006a Sssssssssss
sss 
        
 2007 -0.158*** 
(0.055) 
 -0.124** 
(0.052) 
-0.208*** 
(0.055) 
 -0.192*** 
(0.052) 
-0.211*** 
(0.055) 
 -0.196*** 
(0.052) 
2008b Sssssssssss
sss 
        
2009  Base Year -0.041 
(0.053) 
 Base Year -0.152*** 
(0.053) 
 Base Year -0.161*** 
(0.053) 
2010c Sssssssssss
ssss 
        
2011  0.101* 
(0.052) 
-0.187*** 
(0.051) 
 0.132** 
(0.052) 
-0.322*** 
(0.051) 
 0.133** 
(0.056) 
-0.349*** 
(0.051) 
2013  0.043 
(0.057) 
-0.235*** 
(0.056) 
 0.064 
(0.058) 
-0.381*** 
(0.057) 
 0.070 
(0.052) 
-0.404*** 
(0.057) 
2015d  Omitted -0.277*** 
(0.053) 
 Omitted -0.445*** 
(0.053) 
 Omitted -0.473*** 
(0.054) 
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Constant 0.094 
(0.115) 
0.137 
(0.122) 
0.259*** 
(0.087) 
-0.057 
(0.114) 
-0.267** 
(0.112) 
0.058 
(0.086) 
-0.111 
(0.114) 
-0.320*** 
(0.122) 
0.018 
(0.086) 
          
Sample Size 39035 25479 64514 39035 25479 64514 39035 25479 64514 
***, **, * statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
a, b, c Omitted due to missing data for survey years 2006, 2008, 2010 
d 2015 is omitted due to collinearity 
 
